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Abstract
We examine the eﬀect of trust on financial investment decisions in a micro-economic
environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture
capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly
aﬀects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company
fixed eﬀects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. We then consider
the relationship between trust and performance, evaluating two competing hypotheses:
one based on the notion that higher trust benefits investment performance, the other
based on the notion that lack of trust constitutes a hurdle to investments. We find
evidence of a negative relationship between trust and exit performance, especially for
IPOs. We further show that more sophisticated investors are more likely to make low
trust investments, and that by doing so they achieve superior performance. Based on
this and some additional evidence we conclude that lack of trust is a hurdle to making
venture capital investments, but that investors who overcome this hurdle tend to do
well.
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“There are countries in Europe [...] where the most serious impediment to
conducting business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of persons who
are supposed fit to be trusted with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of
money.” (John Stuart Mill)
Many economists intuitively recognize the importance of trust for economic transactions.
Since Arrow’s (1973) remark that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself
an element of trust” a small literature has analyzed the role of trust in economic decisions.
For example, the work of Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and Johnson (1998), and
Zak and Knack (2001) establishes a positive relationship between trust and economic
growth. More recently, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) study the importance of trust
for bilateral trade in goods, financial assets, and direct foreign investment, and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2008) use Dutch and Italian data to establish an eﬀect of trust on
stock market participation.
In this paper we ask whether trust among nations aﬀects the decision to make an
investment across diﬀerent countries, and we ask whether trust is related to investment
performance. To answer these questions we use a unique hand-collected dataset of Euro-
pean venture capital investments that allows us to study the eﬀect of trust using a powerful
fixed-eﬀect identification strategy. Trust among nations is a robust predictor for venture
capital investments. We also find that low trust investments are associated with better
investment performance, and that it is more sophisticated investors that are more likely
to make such low trust investments.
Following the social capital literature, we define trust as a subjective belief about the
likelihood that a potential trading partner will act honestly. It is important to distinguish
two diﬀerent types of trust. Generalized trust pertains to the preconceptions that people of
one identifiable group have for people from another identifiable group. Personalized trust,
instead, concerns the evolving relationship between two specific agents. In this paper we
focus solely on generalized trust, so that we are concerned with what might be considered
cursory beliefs, generalizations about others, even stereotypes.
Our first question is whether generalized trust aﬀects the likelihood that a venture
capital firm will invest in a start-up company. Prior to investing, there is a search process
where entrepreneurs vie for the attention of venture capitalists, which in turn, have to incur
time and costs in screening potential deals. We hypothesize that higher trust facilitates
this matching process. Moreover, we conjecture that in addition to the country location of
the venture capital firm, the nationality of individual venture capital partners also aﬀects
the trust relationship with entrepreneurs, and therefore the likelihood of investing.
Our second question concerns the relationship between trust and investment perfor-
mance. We identify two competing hypotheses, one focusing on the benefits of investing,
the other on the costs. The first hypothesis is that higher trust makes it easier for in-
vestors and entrepreneurs to interact with each other, and therefore increases the benefits
of investing. Under this “Cooperative Trust” hypothesis we would expect a positive re-
lationship between trust and performance. The second hypothesis focuses on the higher
costs of making low trust investments, and argues that investors are only willing to do
so when expecting higher investment returns. Under this “Trust Hurdle” hypothesis we
would expect a negative relationship between trust and performance.
We examine these two questions in the context of venture capital investment decisions.
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Venture capital provides a particularly attractive testing ground for the eﬀects of trust. On
the one hand, one can reasonably argue that venture capitalists are sophisticated investors
who would not act upon poorly-informed priors, and who are well positioned to exploit
any arbitrage opportunities. On the other hand, one might counter that the financing of
new companies inherently involves limited hard information, high (Knightian) uncertainty,
and considerable scope for opportunistic behavior. Investors can therefore be more prone
to rely on soft information, including social beliefs such as trust.
We use a hand-collected dataset of European venture capital investments made be-
tween 1998 and 2001 that contains investors and companies from 15 European countries,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US. The dataset contains detailed information that can-
not be obtained from any commercially available database, including the experience and
nationality of each venture capital partner and some features of the contracts used for
financing. One of the advantages of using microeconomic data is that reverse causality
can be safely dismissed: trust among nation can aﬀect venture capital investments, but
the venture capital industry is clearly too small to influence the trust among nations.
Given the inherently subjective nature of trust, it is appropriate to measure it by
surveying opinions. We adopt the approach of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) of
using the Eurobarometer survey data of bilateral trust among nations. This measure is
based on how much citizens of one country say they trust the citizens of each other country
(including their own).
We find a positive eﬀect of trust on investments. The eﬀect is highly significant, both
statistically and economically. A one percentage point increase in those who have high
trust towards another country implies an almost seven percentage point increase in the
probability that an investment is made. Our econometric specification considers all poten-
tial financing deals between investors and companies in our sample and asks which deals
are actually realized. We account for any country-specific factors, such as regulation, taxes,
institutions or country-specific investment opportunities using both investor fixed eﬀects
and company country fixed eﬀects (company fixed eﬀects in conditional logit models). The
fixed eﬀects also take care of any investor-specific eﬀects, like quality or attitudes towards
risk, as well as for systematic diﬀerences in company quality across countries. Therefore,
the only variables that matter are those that measure relative (or dyadic) distances be-
tween the investor and the company. We distinguish two types of dyadic variables: those
that vary at the country-pair level and those that vary at the individual investor-company
pair level. The Eurobarometer measure of generalized trust is a country-dyadic variable.
To isolate the eﬀect of trust and eliminate alternative explanations we consider additional
country-dyadic variables that control for diﬀerences in GDP, legal origin, language overlap,
common borders, and the amount of information about foreign countries available in the
business press. At the individual-dyadic level we control for the actual distance between
each individual investor’s and each individual company’s town. We also control for the
investor’s propensity to invest in the company’s stage and industry. We provide numerous
robustness checks, including alternative ways of measuring trust.
Measuring returns in venture capital is fraught with diﬃculty, so we use the standard
approach in the literature of focusing on investment outcomes–see Da Rin, Hellmann and
Puri (2011) for a discussion. We consider three measures: (i) IPOs, which are relatively
few but clearly associated with high returns; (ii) EXIT, a measure which also includes
acquisitions–a more frequent but also a noisier measure of success; and (iii) FAILURE,
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which identifies companies that have gone out of business. Our evidence points to a neg-
ative relationship between trust and performance. In simple logit models the coeﬃcients
for trust are always negative for the IPO and EXIT, and always positive for the FAIL-
URE. They are often, but not always statistically significant. When we include investor
fixed eﬀects the coeﬃcients always retain their sign, but lose significance. In other words,
investor characteristics largely account for the negative relationship between trust and
performance. By contrast, controlling for unobservable selection in a Heckman regression
has little eﬀect on the relationship of trust with performance. Overall, these results are
consistent with the Trust Hurdle hypothesis, and so with an interpretation that trust
aﬀects the costs, rather than the benefits, of investing.
We further explore the Trust Hurdle hypothesis using additional data from our survey.
First, we consider the role of investor heterogeneity, exploring the possibility that diﬀerent
investors might be diﬀerently able to overcome trust hurdles. Following Kaplan, Martel
and Strömberg (2007), we consider US experience as a measure of investor sophistication.
We show that venture capital firms whose partners have US experience are more willing
to make low trust investments. Moreover, we find that they achieve better investment
performance, and that this derives largely from their low trust investments. These results
are consistent with the prediction that more sophisticated investors are better positioned
to overcome trust hurdles, and that doing so is associated with superior performance.
Second, the Trust hurdle hypothesis predicts that investors will make more low trust
investments when they perceive them to be more attractive opportunities. This suggests
that there may be heterogeneity across markets, i.e., across groups of deals with diﬀerent
degree of attractiveness to investors. The prediction is that more attractive markets
draw more low trust investors. While we cannot measure investors’ perceptions of market
attractiveness directly, we use the benefit of hindsight to construct a measure of market
attractiveness based on the eventual IPO rate of all companies in a particular market,
defined by the country, industry and year dimensions. Consistent with our prediction, we
find that low trust investments are more likely in more attractive markets. Moreover, we
find that the negative relationship between trust and performance becomes stronger in
more attractive markets.
The evidence on investment performance does not support the Cooperative Trust hy-
pothesis. To ensure that this is not due merely to the preponderance of a strong trust
hurdle eﬀect, we consider two additional pieces of evidence. The Cooperative Trust hypoth-
esis argues that greater generalized trust has the benefit of allowing venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs to forge a closer and smoother working relationship. Guided by the
prior venture capital literature, we first look at the informal communication and advice
that venture capitalists provide to entrepreneurs by interacting with them. Under the
Cooperative Trust hypothesis we would expect more interaction between investors and
entrepreneurs. From our survey we obtain a measure of the intensity of such interaction.
However, our regression estimates show no significant relationship between generalized
trust and the level of interaction.
Second, we look at the use of contingent contracts. A prior literature identifies contin-
gent contracts as a sophisticated solution to solving a variety of agency conflicts between
entrepreneurs and investors. In practice these sophisticated contracts may be costly to
set up, requiring detailed negotiation and considerable lawyer time. Under the Coopera-
tive Trust hypothesis, one would expect that trust is a substitute for these complex legal
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contracts, so that they would mainly be used in situations of low trust. We find the op-
posite: there is a positive relationship between trust and the use of contingent contracts;
the eﬀect becomes insignificant with the inclusion of investor fixed eﬀects. Thus none of
our additional evidence supports the Cooperative Trust hypothesis.
We believe this paper is the first to examine the eﬀect of generalized trust in a corpo-
rate finance setting. This contributes to both our understanding of the role of trust, and of
corporate financial transactions. First we are able to identify an eﬀect of trust on invest-
ments in a micro-economic environment where alternative explanations can be controlled,
most notably with powerful combination of investor and company fixed eﬀects. We are
also able to leverage our unique data to obtain some new insights into how the eﬀect of
trust varies across diﬀerent types of investors. Second, our analysis derives some results
about the relationship between generalized trust and investment performance, which are
new to the corporate finance literature. Our evidence suggests that lack of trust imposes
a hurdle for investments. Importantly, it is a hurdle but not a barrier, so that we can
derive some key comparative statics on when investors are more or less able to overcome
these trust hurdles. Overall this analysis establishes that generalized trust is a force that
cannot be ignored in the analysis of venture capital investment. This naturally opens the
door for further research on what other corporate financial transactions might be aﬀected
by trust.
One of our most interesting results is that sophisticated investors seem better able to
overcome trust hurdles, and doing so is associated with better investment performance.
Does this results uncover an irrational behavioral investment pattern? One could easily
give this result a behavioral interpretation: less sophisticated investors forgo profitable in-
vestment opportunities because of an ‘irrational’ lack of trust that limits their investments.
However, what we observe in the data is heterogeneity among investors that is consistent
with diﬀerential costs of overcoming trust barriers. If these costs are purely imagined, then
a behavioral interpretation is warranted. However, these costs might well be real–e.g.,
the cost of performing due diligence, or the cost of convincing the counterpart that you
are trustworthy–in which case there is no irrational bias to speak of. Since we cannot
verify the nature of these costs, we caution against too hasty a behavioral interpretation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the relevant
literature. Section 2 develops the paper’s theoretical motivations. Section 3 explains our
data and variables. In Section 4 we examine the eﬀect of trust on investment forma-
tion. Section 5 examines the eﬀect of trust on performance. Section 6 delves deeper into
the Trust Hurdle hypothesis, testing additional predictions about investor and company
heterogeneity. Section 7 finally considers additional evidence concerning the Cooperative
Trust hypothesis. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
1 Literature review
Our paper builds on, and contributes to, a number of literatures. Most closely related is the
literature on the eﬀects of trust on financial decisions. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008)
document that trust aﬀects the willingness to invest money in shares, and thus contribute
to explaining limited participation in the stock market. We examine the decision to
invest not by individuals who allocate their savings to liquid markets, but by sophisticated
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financial intermediaries that invest in illiquid companies. Moreover, Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2009) establish the importance of trust for aggregate trade and foreign direct
investment flows. We provide an analysis that is complementary yet distinct. Their
analysis remains at the macro level, i.e., at the level of country pairs. We are able to analyze
data at the level of individual investor-company pairs. This allows us to address a diﬀerent
set of questions, such as the importance of individual investor characteristics, or the eﬀect
of trust on the interaction and contracts between investors and entrepreneurs. We can
also address the question of how trust is related to investment performance. Our deal-level
data also permits us to control for a comprehensive set of alternative explanatory factors,
and thus to better isolate the role of trust. Because we focus on a small segment of the
economy, we can also safely eliminate any concerns about reverse causality. We can thus
bypass all the diﬃculties of having to find appropriate instruments for the determinants
of trust.
For the venture capital literature our paper makes a novel contribution by addressing
deal formation, an issue that has received surprisingly little attention so far. Two recent
exceptions are Bengtsson and Hsu (2010) and Hegde and Tumlinson (2011) who use similar
empirical approaches to ours and find evidence of assortative matching for investors and
entrepreneurs from same ethnic background. Our paper introduces trust as an important
factor in the generation and structuring of deals.
Our paper also contributes to research on the ’home bias’ investment puzzle (see Bae,
Stulz and Tan (2008), Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996), French and Poterba
(1991), and the survey by Karolyi and Stulz (2003)). Our analysis goes beyond previous
work by examining not only whether transactions occur, but also how they perform. We
also contribute to the recent literature on cross-border venture capital investments, looking
at what factors influence the choice of investing abroad and at syndication and staging
in foreign deals–see Balcarcel, Hertzel, and Lindsey (2010), and Chemmanur, Hull, and
Krishan (2011). Note also that because of investor country fixed eﬀects our analysis
already absorbs all cross-country diﬀerences in legal systems, so that the eﬀects of trust
we document go beyond diﬀerences in legal systems.1 Also related to our results are those
by Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2012), who find that the amount of trusting within
diﬀerent nations is negatively related to both the volume of mergers and the combined
merger announcement returns.
Finally, our study contributes to the broader literature on the economic eﬀects of social
capital (see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for
recent surveys). Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sorensen (2007) investigate the eﬀect of social
capital on financial integration among European regions, finding that regions where the
level of confidence and trust is high are more financially integrated with each other. Our
results suggest that even in developed countries with good legal enforcement investment
decisions may be aﬀected by trust.2
1See also Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2009), Cumming, Schmidt and Walz (2010), Kaplan, Martel
and Strömberg (2007), and Lerner and Schoar (2005).
2Also related to our paper is the work of Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2012), which analyzes
managerial practices at multinational companies around the world. They show that firms located in areas
with higher trust tend to be in industries that rely on decentralization. Moreover, they find that trust
facilitates delegation from the headquarters by improving cooperation.
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2 Theoretical motivation
2.1 What is trust?
In this paper we use a commonly accepted definition of trust, as “the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular
action.”3 Two diﬀerent types of trust are relevant for our study: personalized trust and
generalized trust. Personalized trust is a set of beliefs that one person has about the
behavior of another specific person. It is based on a repeated interaction between the
two individuals and can thus be thought of as an informed belief. Generalized trust, by
contrast, is a set of beliefs about the behavior of a random member of an identifiable group
of individuals. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) argue that “the main diﬀerence between
the two is that, for each pair of newly matched agents, the former takes time and eﬀort to
establish, while the latter is instantaneous.” From an economics perspective, the diﬀerence
between generalized and personalized trust can be thought of as the diﬀerence between
poorly-informed prior beliefs versus well-informed posterior beliefs. From an econometric
perspective, a key diﬀerence is that generalized trust is exogenous to the specific micro-
economic transaction, whereas personalized trust is inherently endogenous.
This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of venture capital. A venture
capitalist and an entrepreneur typically do not know each other before contracting. After
investing, they work closely together (Hellmann and Puri (2002)). At the beginning of
their relationship, the (generalized) trust between a potential venture capitalist investor
and an entrepreneur is exogenous. Once their relationship has developed, trust becomes
personalized and endogenous to the numerous decisions and interactions made along the
way. In our study we focus solely on generalized trust.4
2.2 Why should trust aﬀect venture capital investments?
Our first hypothesis is that higher generalized trust increases the likelihood that a venture
capitalist invests in an entrepreneur’s company. The underlying logic is that trust helps
the search process through which the two parties in the transaction find each other and
make the investment decision. For example, a venture capital firm with low (generalized)
trust of an entrepreneur may never take much interest in her business plan. Indeed,
venture capitalists seriously consider only a small fraction of all business plans proposed
to them (Tyebjee and Bruno (1984)). Similarly, an entrepreneur who has low (generalized)
trust of a venture capital firm may never bother to initiate contact. Indeed, entrepreneurs
typically contact only a subset of all the venture capitalists that are active at any point in
time. We therefore submit that higher generalized trust increases the probability that a
pair of venture capitalist and entrepreneur generate a match, i.e., that they progress from
3A large literature which spans several social sciences examines the concept of trust and its eﬀects on
human behavior. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), Möllering (2006), and Nooteboom (2002) review
this literature from diﬀerent angles.
4Another conceptual distinction is between trusting and trustworthiness (see Glaeser et al. (2000)).
Trusting describes a focal person’s beliefs about others, whereas trustworthiness describes other’s beliefs
about the focal person. In our context, the distinction between trusting and trustworthiness corresponds to
the distinction between the venture capitalists’ trust of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs’ trust of venture
capitalists.
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the initial state of non-acquainted potential partners all the way to an actual investment.5
There are three possible objections to our hypothesis. The first is that there should be
no systematic diﬀerences in how diﬀerent people trust a set of individuals. Indeed, if agents
have common priors and update them based on all the available information, no systematic
diﬀerences should persist at the level of generalized trust, which, by construction, excludes
private information. A problem with this line of argument is that it doesn’t seem to be
supported by the data. In Section 3.4 we show that trust diﬀerentials are both pervasive
and remarkably persistent. Moreover, subjective beliefs can be thought of as non-common
priors (Morris (1995)). Their influence can persist when there is limited information
exchange and limited updating of beliefs. These conditions are likely to hold in illiquid
and opaque markets such as venture capital.6
A second possible objection to our hypothesis is that even if trust diﬀerences persist,
they should not matter, because sophisticated investors can undo them by taking advan-
tage of arbitrage opportunities. This argument seems applicable to liquid and transparent
markets, but is less forceful in venture capital, where arbitrage requires a long horizon.
Moreover, lack of trust can be self-fulfilling, i.e., it can be explained by the existence of
multiple equilibria (Greif (1993)); in the low equilibrium arbitrage is infeasible because
the counter-party also has low trust.
A third objection is that the probability that two partners engage in an economic
transaction depends on their social networks, an argument often made by sociologists
(e.g., Granovetter (1995)). In the context of venture capital, it seems plausible that social
networks facilitate the process of search (see Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and Hochberg et
al. (2007)). From an economist’s perspective, a problem with this objection is that social
networks themselves are endogenously formed in a way that reflects the patterns of trust
among nations. They can facilitate the matching of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists,
but should not be viewed as the ultimate drivers of this process. We therefore view social
networks not as an alternative hypothesis, but one of the channels through which trust
can aﬀect the formation of venture capital investments.
We also conjecture that the identity of individual decision makers within the investor’s
organization matters for investments. Venture capital is an appropriate context to put this
conjecture to test. This is because the decision to invest is made not by a single individual
but by the whole set of partners in the venture capital firm, who have equity in the firm
and meet periodically to make investment decisions (Sahlman (1990)). Further, we look
at whether individual partners’ experience aﬀects investment decisions (see Bottazzi, Da
Rin, and Hellmann (2008)). We conjecture that deeper experience may mitigate the eﬀect
of trust, since partners with better experience may become more competent in screening
business plans and entrepreneurial teams, and might therefore be less influenced by broader
societal belief patters such as generalized trust.
5Nooteboom (2000) notes that in times of radical innovation the importance of tacit knowledge makes
the codification needed for enforceable contracts diﬃcult. In venture capital investments both parties are
exposed to outcome uncertainty, and there are numerous possibilities for opportunistic behavior within a
venture capital relationship (Sahlman (1990)).
6Sociologists frequently argue that in situations where agents have little objective information, social
cues (such as generalized trust) become an important basis for decision making (see Podolny (1994)).
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2.3 How is trust related to performance?
From a theoretical perspective, one may argue that trust can aﬀect either the benefits or
the costs of investing. For the benefits side, a natural hypothesis is that higher generalized
trust enables investors and entrepreneurs to interact more easily with each other. This
allows them to establish a more eﬀective working relationship which enhances venture
performance. We call this the "Cooperative Trust" hypothesis. For the cost side a natural
hypothesis is that investors have to incur some private costs of overcoming trust hurdles.
These private costs could be purely imagined or they could also be real: for example, an
investor may have to spend more time on the due diligence process; he may even have a
harder time convincing the entrepreneur of the merits of accepting his money. We call
this the "Trust Hurdle" hypothesis.
Both hypotheses predict that higher generalized trust invites more investments. The
diﬀerence concerns the predictions about performance. Under the "Cooperative Trust"
hypothesis we would expect that the benefits of an easier working relationship translate
into more successful investment outcomes. This generates a positive relationship between
trust and performance. By contrast, under the “Trust Hurdle” hypothesis, investors are
only willing to incur the costs of low trust investments if they expect higher venture
performance. As a consequence we expect low trust investments only in situations where
investors anticipate high investment performance. This hypothesis therefore generates a
negative relationship between trust and performance.
We notice that neither a positive nor a negative relationship between trust and per-
formance informs us about the rationality of investors’ choices. For example, it might
be tempting to argue that a negative relationship between trust and performance proves
that investors have an ’irrational’ preference for investing in bad companies in countries
they trust, over good companies in countries they don’t trust. This might be true if gen-
eralized trust is merely a stereotype. However, if lack of trust imposes real transactions
costs, then even perfectly rational investors would apply a higher investment standard
before making an investment in a low trust country. Because it is essentially impossible
to observe the detailed costs and constraints that venture capitalists face when making
their investment decisions, we refrain from drawing conclusions about trust eﬀects being
rational or behavioral.
3 Data and variables
In this section we describe our data sources and motivate our variables, which are defined
in Table 1. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent
variables. Table 3 reports pairwise correlations among variables.
3.1 Data sources
Our data comes from a variety of sources. The main data are gathered through a survey of
685 venture capital firms in 15 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK. Venture firms were included in our sample if they : (i) were full
members of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national venture
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capital organization in 2001, (ii) were actively engaged in venture capital and (iii) were
still in operations in 2002. The survey asked detailed information on all first rounds of
venture capital investments made between January 1998 and December 2001, as well as
information on the venture firm’s partners.7 We exclude buyout investments.
We received 107 usable responses, which we cross-checked using investor and company
websites, commercial databases, and trade publications. Our data represent a comprehen-
sive cross-section which provides a good coverage of all countries, with an overall response
rate of nearly 16%, a rate significantly larger than for comparable surveys of industrial
firms (see Graham and Harvey (2001)). No single country dominates the sample, and no
country is left out. Our data are not dominated by a few respondents: the largest venture
capital firm accounts for only 5% of the observations, and the largest five for only 16%.
Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008, 2009) provide a more extensive discussion of the
data, and report additional tests that confirm the representativeness of the sample.
The main independent variable is the trust from citizens of one country towards citizens
of another country. This variable is collected by Eurostat through the yearly Eurobarom-
eter survey of citizens of all European countries. We report in Table 1 the sources for all
other independent variables.
3.2 Unit of observation
We adopt two units of observation. In the first part of the analysis, we focus on the
decision to invest, i.e., whether to make a deal or not. For this we construct the sample
of all potential deals, consisting of every possible pairing between the 107 investors and
their 1,170 portfolio companies. Portfolio companies are located in one of the 15 European
Union countries venture investors are from; they are also located in Norway, Switzerland,
and the US, since Eurostat collects data on trust in citizens of those countries. The unit
of observation is the individual investor-company pair (as in Sørensen (2007)). For each
company we consider that it could in principle be financed by any of the respondent
venture firms. We take into account that some pairs are not feasible because the venture
capitalist began operations after the date the company was seeking an investment. Our
potential deals dataset includes 101,620 potential deals.
We analyze investment decisions in a discrete choice framework where investors choose
among companies as investment alternatives. In addition to a logit model, we use a con-
ditional logit model where, in the terminology of McFadden (1984), we think of investors
as cases and companies as the alternatives. This approach takes the investors’ perspec-
tive which corresponds to our survey design. In this set-up the trust variable measures
how people from the investor’s country trust people from the company’s country. While
investors choose companies, those companies also choose to accept the investments. We
therefore also estimate our model treating companies as cases and investors as alternatives,
in which case the trust variable measures how people from the company’s country trust
people from the investor’s country.
One feature of our analysis is that to be included in our sample, a company must have
received funding from at least one investor. We clearly cannot observe all the ’marginal’
7We use the term ’firm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital firm) and the term ’company’ for the
company that receives the venture capital financing.
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companies that never received any funding from any venture capitalist.8 Our analysis
therefore examines whether trust aﬀects investment decisions among all ’infra-marginal’
companies, excluding any eﬀect that trust may have on the marginal companies. It is
possible that higher levels of trust increase the size of the venture capital market. Indeed,
Figure 1 shows a positive correlation of 0.51 (significant at the 6% confidence level) between
the size of the venture capital market, measured by aggregate investment (relative to per-
capita GDP), and the level of trust received by each country. Therefore it is likely that
our analysis understates the total eﬀect of trust.
In the second part of the analysis we focus on the relationship between trust and
investment performance. For this part of the analysis we use what we call the realized
deals sample, which consists of all the investments that we observe in our data. Our
realized deals sample contains a total of 1,228 deals, into 1,170 companies, made by 107
venture capital firms.9
3.3 Dependent variables
In the first part of the analysis we ask whether a particular investor finances a particular
company. The dependent variable is DEAL, which is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the venture capital firm has invested in a particular company and 0 otherwise.
In the second part of the analysis we examine what type of outcomes companies have
experienced. We assess outcome performance as of August 2011, almost ten years after
the end of our sample frame using commercial databases (Amadeus, ThomsonOne, and
Worldscope), press articles (using Lexis-Nexis), and web searches. We classify companies
into five distinct exit categories: (i) the company had an IPO; (ii) the company was
acquired; (iii) the company went out of business; (iv) the company is still in the venture
firm’s portfolio and operating; and (v) the company cannot be traced. We aggregate these
categories into three variables that have a clear economic interpretation. IPOs provide the
most successful outcome for investors. Therefore, IPO measures whether a company went
public or not. The second dependent variable, EXIT, includes both IPOs and acquisitions.
EXIT is a broader but likely noisier measure of investment success. The third dependent
variable, FAILURE, identifies companies that went out of business or whose situation
cannot be traced. These ’untraceable’ companies can be reasonably considered a failure
because venture firms typically report the exit of portfolio companies to the business press
and on their websites.
3.4 Independent variables
Our analysis is based on the Eurobarometer measures of trust, that was previously used
(and described in detail) by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009). Eurobarometer is a
large survey about the social and political attitudes of citizens of the European Union
that is executed yearly for the European Commission since 1970. Our trust measure is
8Note that even if we did, their observations would fall out of the regression by the time we consider
the conditional logit model.
9There are more deals than companies because 51 companies receive financing from more than one of
our venture investors.
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derived from the Eurobarometer survey waves from 1990 to 1996.10. Specifically, we define
trust as the percentage of the citizens in one country that trust a lot people from the other
country, as in Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2012).
How reliable is this measure of trust? First, the trust measure reflects patterns one
would intuitively expect: people typically have the highest trust for their own country;
Scandinavian countries receive high trust, and are also more trusting; the British trust
the French less than other nations; and the French are happy to reciprocate. Second,
the Eurobarometer trust measure has a strong correlation with the World Values Survey
(WVS) measure of trusting, which has been used by several studies (e.g., Knack and
Keefer (1997)). The correlation coeﬃcient is 0.72, significant at the 1% level.11 This
strong correlation suggests a reliable measurement of trust that does not depend on the
details of how the surveys were implemented. We also notice that trust among nations is
remarkably persistent over time: The correlation coeﬃcients across Eurobarometer waves
is often over 90% and always above 84%.
The remaining country-dyadic variables are meant to capture other factors that should
aﬀect the investment decision, or that constitute potentially alternative explanations. We
employ three variables that are standard controls in the literature on geography and trade:
(i) whether an investor/company pair is either located in the same country or not, (ii)
whether an investor/company pair is in neighboring countries (sharing a common border),
and (iii) how economically far away are two countries, using the diﬀerence of the logarithm-
transformed per-capita GDP. We then consider the role of search costs by looking at the
amount of information on each country that is reported in another country’s main business
newspaper. We also consider two country-dyadic variables that capture transaction costs:
the similarity of languages and of legal systems. To account for the intensity of economic
relationships between countries we use two standard measures from the trade literature:
the share of exports and of foreign direct investments from country i into country j (in
billions of dollars), averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001.
Our other independent variables vary at diﬀerent levels. Three variables are measured
at the level of the investor-company pair. First, we compute the log-transformed kilometric
distance between the investor’s and company’s cities using the geodetic formula.12 Second,
we compute two measures to capture an investor’s propensity to make a deal in a company’s
industry and stage of financing: the share of investments of a venture capital firm in the
same industry in which the company operates, and the share of investments of a venture
capital firm in the same stage at which the company is receiving financing. We consider
several company characteristics: its country; its industry; the year in which the company
received funding; and whether the company seeks early stage (seed or start-up) or late
stage (expansion and bridge) financing. As discuss below, we use a variety of fixed eﬀects,
10We do not collect trust data directly from our survey respondents, since such a measure would be
endogenous to their investment experience. The Eurobarometer measure, on the contrary, is clearly ex-
ogenous to the investments made by venture capitalists.
11The WVS survey question is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The WVS therefore only measures how trusting citizens
of one country are, rather than bilateral country-dyadic trust. Therefore, we compute the correlation
coeﬃcient using the Eurobarometer trust measure for citizens of the same country.
12Such precision allows us to avoid some of the measurement problems that have plagued the literature
on trade and geography, which typically uses a much coarser measure–the distance between capital cities
(see Head and Mayer (2010)).
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sometimes controlling for investor fixed eﬀects, sometimes controlling for company fixed
eﬀects, and sometimes for both. Whenever we don’t control for company fixed eﬀects,
we use company country fixed eﬀects. And whenever we don’t control for investor fixed
eﬀects, we control for the following three investor characteristics: (i) the natural logarithm
of 1 plus the age of the venture firm; (ii) the natural logarithm of 1 plus the amount
under management at the venture firm ; and (iii) whether an investor is an independent
or captive venture capital firm, where captive means that the venture firm is owned by a
corporation, a financial institution, or a government.
In section 6 we introduce two additional control variables. First we define a dummy
variable for whether a venture firms has any partners that have prior work experience in
the US. We obtain this data from our survey which asks about prior US work experience
for each partner. Second, we define a measure of market attractiveness that we explain in
more detail in section 6.2.
4 The role of trust for deal formation
4.1 Methodology
We begin by asking what factors influence a venture capitalist’s decision to invest in a
company. Our unit of analysis is the sample of potential deals. We estimate the prob-
ability that a specific venture capitalist invests in a specific company with the following
econometric model:
 = + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +  (1)
Let  index investors and  index companies, let  = ( ) index investor-company (po-
tential) pairs, and let  index investor-company country dyads. The dependent variable
is DEAL, which is a dummy variable for whether investor  finances company . The
intercept term is denoted by . The vector  0 represents variables that vary at the
country-dyadic level, namely TRUST, FOREIGN—DEAL, COMMON—BORDER, INFOR-
MATION, GDP—DIFFERENCE, LANGUAGE—OVERLAP, and LEGAL—DIFFERENCE.
The vector  0 represents variables that vary at the investor-company pair level, namely
DISTANCE, INDUSTRY—FIT and STAGE—FIT. The vectors  0 and  0 represent vari-
ables that vary across investors and companies, respectively; we discuss them below.
To estimate the probability that a deal occurs, we use a logit model (our results do
not change when we use a probit). To control for investor characteristics we can aﬀord
to use a complete set of investor fixed eﬀects, i.e., 107 dummies. This is clearly the
most powerful way of controlling for any investor-specific eﬀects, including the investor’s
nationality. The investor fixed eﬀects also take care of any systematic diﬀerences across
investors, including quality and risk aversion. To control for company characteristics, we
use INDUSTRY, STAGE and DEAL—DATE. In addition, we use company country fixed
eﬀects. This means that we control for the overall level of trustworthiness (e.g., on average
the Swedes are trusted more than the Spaniards). As a consequence our trust variables
always reflect relative trust (e.g., relative to the average level of trust, the Spaniards are
more trusted by the French than by the British). Moreover, the company country fixed
eﬀects control for any country-specific eﬀects, such as investment opportunities, the legal
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and institutional environment, and investor friendliness. The coeﬃcient of trust therefore
captures how deviations from the average level of trust towards the company’s country
aﬀect the likelihood that an investor will make a deal with a company located in that
country. 13With over one thousand companies in our sample we cannot add one fixed
eﬀect for every company. However, to control even more finely for company characteristics,
we also consider a conditional logit model. This semi-parametric specification eﬀectively
includes both investor and company fixed eﬀects, thus providing the richest possible set
of controls. In all logit regressions we cluster the standard errors at the level of the
country dyad, reflecting that our key independent variable TRUST varies at that level.
However, such clustering violates the independence of individual errors across groups in
the conditional logit, so that we use robust standard errors for those regressions.
We want to distinguish trust from home bias. There are many reasons why investors
may prefer to invest in a domestic company (Karolyi and Stulz (2003)). While trust may
be one of those reasons–indeed people tend to express the highest trust for their own
countrymen–we not do want to rely a preference for domestic deals to identify the eﬀect
of trust. We therefore separately control for whether a company is located in the same or
diﬀerent country than the investor, as captured by the FOREIGN—DEAL dummy. Thus
our estimate of the trust eﬀect is conservative, as we eliminate one important channel
through which trust may aﬀect investments.
4.2 Main results
The estimates from the simple and conditional logit models are reported in Table 4. In
column (i) we report the results of the logit estimation without any country-dyadic con-
trols (except those related to geography, namely foreign deal and common border); in
column (ii) we include all the country-dyadic controls. In columns (iii) and (iv) we report
the results from the conditional logit model, first without and then with country-dyadic
controls.
We find that the coeﬃcient on TRUST is positive and significant at the 1% level across
all specifications. This clearly supports the hypothesis that trust aﬀects the likelihood
of making an investment. In addition to being statistically significant, the estimated
coeﬃcient measures an economically important eﬀect. We focus on column (ii) in Table
4, which is our main specification; results for the other specifications are very similar. The
logit regression estimates the odds ratio, defined as the ratio of the probability of success
to the probability of failure of the event (in our case of a deal being made). Consider a one
point increase in the percentage of people that express high trust. An example (drawn
near the median of the trust distribution) is that 15.3% of Spaniards have high trust
for Germans, and 16.3% of Dutch have high trust for Germans. Such a one percentage
point increase, averaged across the values of the covariates, generates a 5.7% increase in
the probability of reaching a deal. Alternatively, consider moving from the 25th to the
75th percentile of the trust distribution. For example, 10.5% of British people highly
trust Germans, which is at the 25th percentile, while 24.8% of Norwegians highly trust
Germans, which is at the 75th percentile. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of
the trust distribution corresponds to a 119% increase in probability of reaching a deal–in
13See Footnote (18)
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other words, it more than doubles it. This magnitude is consistent with the results for
portfolio investments of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).
Table 4 contains several other results. Geographic distance is very important. The
coeﬃcient for DISTANCE has a negative sign and is statistically highly significant in all
specifications. This confirms the notion that venture capital is a highly localized activity.
The coeﬃcient for FOREIGN—DEAL is negative and statistically significant in all four
specifications. The coeﬃcient for COMMON—BORDER is insignificant. The coeﬃcient
of INFORMATION is positive and statistically highly significant. This result suggests
that search costs, broadly defined, matter. The result is even more surprising given the
fact that our measure is only a rough proxy for diﬀerences in the amount of informa-
tion available to investors. GDP—DIFFERENCE is negative and statistically significant,
LANGUAGE—OVERLAP is positive, and LEGAL—DIFFERENCE is negative but never
significant. Throughout all regressions we find that INDUSTRY—FIT and STAGE—FIT
have a highly significant eﬀect, with an (expected) positive sign. This shows that special-
ization is an important aspect of the venture capital market: companies need to fit into
investors’ strategic preferences in order to attract investments.
The results in Table 4, beyond using investor and company country fixed eﬀects, al-
ready controls for many alternative explanations other than trust. We can go even further
and ask to what extent the relationship between trust and venture investments diﬀers
from the relationship between trust and trade, identified by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2009). To examine this we include measures of trade or foreign direct investments (FDI)
as additional controls. One reason for doing this is that existing patterns of trade may
facilitate venture investments. Another reason is to test whether trust matters more for
venture investment than for general trade flows. However, there is also one reason not
to include trade. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) establish a positive relationship
between trust and aggregate trade flows. Including trade in our equation therefore intro-
duces multicollinearity, i.e., the model may be over-specified. Table 5 reports the results
of adding EXPORTS or FDI to our logit and conditional logit specifications with dyadic
variables. As expected, we find that both variables are positive and statistically signifi-
cant. However, their inclusion does not aﬀect the significance and magnitude of the trust
variable. This suggests that, even after possibly over-specifying the model, we continue to
find that trust matters. In fact, the evidence suggests that trust matters more for venture
capital investment than for aggregate trade and FDI flows.
4.3 Further discussion
In this subsection we discuss a variety of extensions and robustness checks for our results
about trust and investment decisions. For brevity’s sake the results are not reported here,
but are available upon request.
4.3.1 Alternative measures of trust
Since our trust variable measures the trust of an average citizen, a potential concern is
that it doesn’t reflect the beliefs of venture capitalists. That is, the average citizen’s trust
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may not apply to the socio-economic group venture capitalists belong to.14 We therefore
recalculate our measure of trust for a subset of the population that is likely to correspond
to the average venture capitalist. Since the Eurobarometer includes some information
on respondents’ characteristics, we restrict our attention to those whose profile broadly
corresponds to that of professionals. More precisely, we consider respondents who are
in the upper half of the income distribution, were at least 20 years old when finishing
their last studies (implying they have at least a bachelor degree), and are between 34 and
50 years old–an interval that covers one standard deviation around the mean age of the
venture partners in our sample. This additional measure of trust has a very high correlation
coeﬃcient with the main measure of trust (0.99), suggesting that socio-economic diﬀerences
have little eﬀect on trust. When we use this alternative measure, all the results of Table
4 remain unaﬀected.
Our analysis so far focuses on the trust of the investor’s country in the company’s
country. This reflects the notion that investors are those who decide whether to make a
deal or not. However, entrepreneurs have to accept their investors, too. We then consider
trust also from the company’s perspective. These two measures contain strong elements of
reciprocity and are therefore highly correlated, so that we cannot include both measures
in the same regression. Instead, we re-estimate our regressions substituting ’investor’ trust
with ’company’ trust. The information variable is our only other asymmetric variable, so
we also rebuild it from the company’s perspective. All of our results remain qualitatively
intact when we adopt the company’s perspective.
We measure trust using the investor’s headquarter location. Since venture capital firms
are small partnerships where the decision-making process is confined within the partners,
we ask whether the presence of partners of diﬀerent nationality aﬀects deal formation.
Our data contains information on the nationality of each venture capital partner, which
allows to examine two possible eﬀects. First, we consider whether any of the partners of
the venture capital firm have the same nationality as the company, since a partner from the
company’s country may increase the likelihood of investing. For example, since the British
have low trust in the French, we ask whether a British firm with a French partner is more
likely to invest in a French company than a British firm without French partners. The
PARTNER—MATCH variable captures this eﬀect. Second, we build a measure of ’average
partners’ trust’ of the venture partnership in a company’s country. For this, we average
the trust scores of all of the venture firm’s partners, based on their country of birth, and
subtract TRUST from this average. PARTNER—TRUST measures the diﬀerential trust
of individual venture capitalists within the firm. Suppose that the British venture capital
firm had an Italian partner. Italians have higher trust for the French than the British.
PARTNER—TRUST measures this increase in trust.15
The results show that the composition of partners inside the venture capital firm
indeed matters for investment decisions. Both PARTNER—MATCH and PARTNER—
TRUST are positive and statistically highly significant, without much aﬀecting the size
14For example, while it may be true that the French hardly enjoy a high level of trust in the pubs of
East London, what we care about is what trust they enjoy in the wine bars of the City of London.
15While generalized trust is clearly exogenous to the venture firm’s investment decisions, the choice of
partners might be endogenous. A venture capital firm that plans to make investments in a certain country
might hire a partner from that country. Therefore, when we use these variables we only aim to establish
correlation, not causation.
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of the TRUST variable, which remains highly significant. These results indicate that the
national composition of partners aﬀects the likelihood of a deal.
We also estimate the eﬀect of trust using the ’average trust’ variable computed by
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009). This measure is based on a cardinal interpretation of
the survey responses, which are coded in a range of 1 to 4. The trust measure is calculated
by taking the average response over individuals and over time to the trust question, after
partialling out time eﬀects. Our results are unchanged.
4.3.2 Alternative sample definitions
The Eurobarometer data contains a bilateral measure of trust not only for the foreign
countries but also for the domestic country. Unlike Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009)
who focus on exports and FDI, we can make use of the domestic trust data. Our regres-
sions already include a control dummy for whether the investor and company are from
the same country or not. To make our results more comparable to the prior literature, we
performed some additional analyses on foreign subsamples. We focus on two definitions
that we call the broad and the narrow foreign subsample. The ’broad’ foreign subsam-
ple excludes investors that only invest domestically. It consists of 48 investors and 1,170
companies. This gives us a subsample where each company is fundable by all its domestic
venture capital firms and by those foreign venture firms that invest abroad; it therefore
contains some (potential and realized) domestic deals–those by venture firms that invest
beyond their home country.16 The ’narrow’ foreign subsample excludes all domestic deals,
potential or realized. It only includes venture firms that invest abroad, and those compa-
nies that have at least one foreign investor. It consists of 48 investors and 217 companies.
The narrow sample is closest to one used in the prior literature, but has several disad-
vantages. It throws away much relevant information, thus reducing our statistical power.
Even more importantly, it alters the economic interpretation of the logit model which now
estimates choices from an artificially constrained choice set. When using these subsamples
we find that the coeﬃcients of trust retain their size and significance as in Table 4.
In defining the sample of potential deals, we deliberately refrain from imposing re-
strictions on the set of admissible potential deals, other than requiring that the venture
capital firm was in existence at the time that the company was seeking funding. This
means that we let the econometric model determine what matches are more or less likely.
An alternative approach is to impose additional restrictions on the set of admissible po-
tential deals, making assumptions about which pairs have a zero probability of resulting
in a deal. While we prefer not to make such assumptions in the main model, we consider
this a useful robustness check. First, we observe that some venture capital firms in our
sample never invest in certain sectors, or in companies at certain stages of development.
We therefore exclude the potential deals where the investor never invests in a company’s
sector or stage. Second, we combine these two restrictions with excluding potential deals
where the investor never invests abroad. In both cases we find that our results are not
aﬀected.
Our unit of analysis is the potential deal, but our key dependent variable, TRUST,
varies at a higher level of aggregation, namely the country-dyad. Our base specification
16None of our results change if we also drop from the set of the potential matches the 516 companies
that are financed by venture firms that invest only domestically.
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thus clusters by country-dyads. As an additional robustness check we aggregate the data
to the level of the country-dyads. This involves a considerable loss of information, since
we have to discard most of the micro-level information. Still, we consider a Poisson
model where the dependent variable is the number of deals in each country dyad, and the
independent variables are just the country-dyad controls. We find that the coeﬃcient on
trust continues to be statistically significant at the 1% level; using a negative binomial
model yields similar results.
4.3.3 Alternative specifications
The prior social capital literature argues that trust among nations is related to the history
of wars, to religious similarities, and even to genetic similarities (Guiso, Sapienza and Zin-
gales (2009)). These variables have no obvious connection to venture capital investments,
and their inclusion comes at the risk of over-specifying the model because they have been
shown to be correlated with trust. Still, we confirm that the main eﬀect of trust continues
to hold even after controlling for these additional factors.
There is a long tradition in economics of distinguishing beliefs from preferences, dating
back at least to the seminal work of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973). In our context, a
concern is to distinguish how much investors ‘trust’ other countries, based on beliefs,
and how much investors ’like’ other countries, based on taste. To measure liking–a
subjective concept that is diﬃcult to measure–, we use the Eurovision Song Contest,
a popular European event, to construct a measure of taste-based preferences that varies
within country pairs. Eurovision is an annual televised music contest among European
countries, where each country is allowed to send one candidate. Viewers from around
Europe rank the contestants from other countries on a scale from 0 to 12. We use these
scores to build a normalized measure of the votes from citizens of country i to the song
of country j in the Eurovision Song Contest, averaged over the period from 1993 to 2001.
While the absolute ranking presumably depends on contestants’ quality, prior research
has argued that the relative vote ranking reflect patterns of how much people from one
European country like others (Clerides and Stengos (2006), Fenn et al. (2006)). As in
Felbermayr and Toubal (2007), we control for song quality through a comprehensive set of
song-specific fixed eﬀects. We find that the eﬀect of trust is not aﬀected by the inclusion
of the Eurovision variable, that is itself statistically not significant.
The venture capital industry is highly cyclical. Our data covers the period 1998-2001,
so that the early sample comes from an upward cycle and the latter part from a down cycle.
One may ask whether the eﬀect of trust is stronger in boom or bust periods. To address
this, we interact the trust variable with two dummies, one for the boom period (1998-1999)
and one for the bust period (2000-2001). We find that both coeﬃcients continue to be
positive and statistically significant. They are very close and their diﬀerence is far from
being statistically significant.
In Table 4 we cluster the standard errors at the country-dyad level for all logit re-
gressions. We consider this a natural choice for clustering, since the main dependent
variable, TRUST, varies at that level. However, there may also be other reasonable ap-
proaches to clustering the standard errors. For instance, because each country appears
multiple times across country-dyads we also implement two-dimensional clustering (Pe-
tersen (2009)) where we cluster both at the company-country and the investor-country
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level. We find that this does not change the sign or statistical significance of any coeﬃ-
cient. Note that we can only do this clustering in the logit model, because such clustering
would violate the assumption of independence of individual errors across groups of the
conditional logit model.17
To account for the fact that we have a small number of realized deals, we rerun our
regressions using the rare events logit package (relogit) developed by Tomz et al. (2003).
Our results are unaﬀected.
Some venture capital firms have multiple oﬃces (Chen et el. (2010)). This may aﬀect
our measure of eﬀective distance between investors and companies. We therefore compute
the minimal distance between each company and all (potential and actual) investors. We
find that none of our results are aﬀected.
Finally, in case one still worries that there remain any unobserved peculiarities in our
data that drive the results, we construct a falsification exercise. Instead of giving each
investor and company its true country identity, we randomly assign a ’false’ country iden-
tity. Based on these false identities, we also recalculate all the country-dyadic variables.
The coeﬃcient of TRUST in our main regressions becomes utterly insignificant, providing
further reassurance that our main result is not an artifact of the sample, but reflects a
real and robust economic phenomenon.
5 The relationship between trust and investment perfor-
mance
5.1 Methodology
We now turn to the relationship between trust and investment performance, focusing on
the investment outcome experienced by venture capital backed companies. In Section 2.3
we discussed two hypotheses about the relationship between trust and performance, one
predicting a positive relationship based on the ease of working together ("Cooperative
Trust" hypothesis), and one predicting a negative relationship based on the cost of over-
coming low trust barriers ("Trust Hurdle" hypothesis). We now turn to the empirical
testing of these competing hypotheses.
5.1.1 Estimation strategy
Our unit of analysis is the sample of realized deals. The dependent variables are the
three measures of investment outcome that we discussed in section 3.3: (i) IPO, as the
main measure of successful investment, (ii) EXIT, which also includes acquisitions, a
more frequent but often less profitable exit route, and (iii) FAILURE, which measures the
frequent occurrence of unsuccessful venture investments.
Our econometric model is given by:
17The conditional logit is a fixed eﬀect model that exploits repeated observations of deals for each investor
(i.e., investors are the ‘groups’). It tests how the characteristics of the investor-company pair aﬀect the
likelihood of the deal, controlling for all the unobserved investor characteristics–which are removed from
the model. Double clustering implies that we cluster for both company and investor nationality. Since
venture capital firms invest in companies located in diﬀerent countries, some of the deals within a group
are domestic and others are foreign. The violation of the independence of individual errors across diﬀerent
groups occurs whenever we cluster the standard errors by company nationality.
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 = + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +  (2)
where  = ( ) indexes the realized investor-company pairs. The  vectors represent
the same variables as in equation (1), except for the fixed eﬀects. In the realized deals
sample the number of observations prevents us from controlling for company fixed eﬀects.
We therefore show the results of two models, one with and one without investor fixed
eﬀects (FE henceforth). In the model without investor FE we control for other investor
characteristics that have shown to be of importance in prior research (Bottazzi, Da Rin and
Hellmann (2008, 2009)): INDEPENDENT—VC, VC—AGE, and VC—SIZE. We also include
investor-country fixed eﬀects. We use a logit model when we do not include investor FE
(using a probit model yields the same results), and we use a conditional logit model when
we include investor FE.
There are good econometric reasons for choosing either model. When using the model
without investor FE we may under-control for investor characteristics, potentially overstat-
ing variation in the data. At the opposite, the model with investor FE may over-control for
investor characteristics, and therefore understate relevant variation in the data. The latter
concern is particularly relevant for smaller sample sizes, such as with our hand-collected
data. There are also diﬀerences in the economic interpretation of the two specifications.
The model with investor FE takes a narrow perspective by considering only variation in
trust within a given investor’s portfolio, whereas the model without investor FE takes a
broader perspective that also includes variation in trust across investors.
Consider, for instance, the Trust Hurdle hypothesis (a similar logic applies to the
Cooperative Trust hypothesis). A possible case is that all investors face the same costs
of overcoming trust hurdles and all perceive the same benefits of doing so. In this case
we would expect substantial variation within investor portfolios and no variation across
venture capital firm. A very diﬀerent case occurs when investors face diﬀerent costs of
overcoming trust hurdles. In this case we would expect variation both within portfolios
and across venture firms. In the first case we would expect that the inclusion of investor
FE does not materially aﬀect the results, whereas in the second case, we would expect
investor FE to explain a substantial part of the variation. We therefore believe that both
models are informative, as they provide complementary information about the relationship
between trust and performance.
5.1.2 Unobservable selection
An additional issue is whether our estimates could be driven by selection on unobservable
deal characteristics. For example, it could be that in low trust situations the only invest-
ments that are made are less risky deals. Since we cannot observe the business nature
of a deal, we could incorrectly attribute to trust what is in eﬀect due to an unobservable
selection eﬀect. To address this concern we estimate a Heckman selection model. The
selection equation is given by equation (1) and the outcome equation by equation (2). We
face the usual identification challenge of augmenting the selection equation with variables
that aﬀect the selection equation, but that can reasonably be excluded from the outcome
equation. Obviously one can always argue that any variable that aﬀects deal formation
also aﬀects contracting. Our plausibility argument is that these variables, while demon-
strably important for deal formation, are unlikely to matter for the on-going relationship
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of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist.
We submit that the EXPORTS and FDI variables are plausible candidates for the
exclusion restriction; we employ EXPORTS in the main analysis, and we obtain the same
results when using FDI instead. A high level of exports and FDI means that two coun-
tries are likely to have well-established networks for facilitating cross-country commercial
transactions. Rauch (2001) suggests that trade flows are related to interpersonal networks.
We therefore allow for the possibility that the presence of these cross-country institutional
links facilitate the search process between entrepreneurs and investors. After the match is
made, however, it is reasonable to assume that these trade-related institutional links no
longer have a direct impact on investment performance. We believe this is a reasonable
assumption, given that there is no natural economic argument why aggregate trade flows
should aﬀect performance of individual venture capital investments. This strikes us as
plausible, given that our regressions already contain many controls, most notably fixed
eﬀects for both investor and company country.
Naturally the exclusion restriction is inherently theoretical and cannot be empirically
tested with data, or made more plausible by anecdotal examples. We therefore make a
cautious interpretation of our findings, i.e., we consider our Heckman specification reason-
able but not definitive. Another cautionary note is that, because of the large number of
observations (over 100,000 in the selection equation) and control variables, we can only
achieve convergence in STATA when we use the linear probability version (heckman in-
stead of heckprob), and invoke the two-step estimation procedure (which still achieves
consistent estimates).
5.2 Main results
We focus our discussion on the relationship between trust and investment performance.
We note from Panel B of Table 3 that the correlation coeﬃcient of trust with IPO is —0.105,
with EXIT is —0.101 and with FAILURE is 0.141 (all significant at the 1% level). This
suggests a negative relationship between trust and performance. To control for observables
and unobservables we move to a multivariate analysis. Table 6 reports the results of the
logit (Panel A) and Heckman (Panel B) regressions without investor FE. Table 7 reports
the results with investor FE.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that trust has a negative eﬀect on the IPO rate, with a
coeﬃcient significant at the 10% level. The coeﬃcient for EXIT is also negative, but
insignificant. The coeﬃcient of trust on FAILURE is positive and significant at 10%.
The logit specification may be aﬀected by unobserved heterogeneity. Panel B therefore
examines our Heckman specification. The results are very similar to those of Panel A:
the coeﬃcient of trust is negative and significant for IPO, negative and insignificant for
EXIT, and positive and significant for FAILURE. Table 7 considers the two specifications
of Table 6, but now with investor FE. Panel A therefore reports results from a conditional
logit model, and Panel B from a Heckman regression. The trust coeﬃcients retain the
same sign as before, but it never reaches the 10% statistical significance level.18
18The careful reader may notice that the number of observations varies across specifications. Table 2
shows that our sample includes 1,228 deals in 1,170 companies. In Tables 6 and 7 the number of deals
is less for several reasons. For 93 deals we are unable to measure the exit event because the company
name was kept anonymous. This leaves us with 1135 deals, as in Table 7B. We do not have information
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In the selection equation of the Heckman model, EXPORTS is highly significant with
the expected sign. The Mills ratio is statistically significant only in the IPO regression of
Panel B of Table 6. Among the control variables, FOREIGN—DEAL is significant without
investor FE, with a negative eﬀect on investment performance, but loses its significance
(except for FAILURE) with investor FE. No other control variables seem to have strong
predictive power in the outcome regressions.
Because the logit and conditional logit are nonlinear models, the estimated coeﬃcients
do not directly reveal economic magnitudes. We therefore compare marginal eﬀects com-
puted at the means across diﬀerent models.19 Consider the IPO variable. For the logit
model of Table 6, we calculate an average marginal eﬀect of trust equal to —1.062. For the
Heckman model of Table 6, we obtain —0.946. The diﬀerence is only 11%, suggesting that
unobservable selection has only a modest eﬀect in explaining the magnitude of the trust
eﬀect. We then compare the marginal eﬀect of the logit model of Table 6 to those we ob-
tain from Table 7, that includes investor FE. For the conditional logit model the marginal
eﬀect is —0.697, which is 34% lower. For the Heckman model the marginal eﬀect is —0.589,
which is 45% lower. The main insight from these comparisons is therefore that investor
FE substantially reduce the estimates of the marginal eﬀect of trust on performance, while
the eﬀect of the Heckman correction is modest.
The same pattern holds for the trust coeﬃcients in the EXIT and FAILURE regression.
Specifically, in the logit model of Table 6 the average marginal eﬀect of trust is —0.746 for
EXIT and 1.078 for FAILURE. The coeﬃcients of the Heckman model of Table 6 are very
similar. The marginal eﬀects of trust in the conditional logit model of Table 7 are —0.436
for EXIT and 1.070 for FAILURE; they become —0.198 for EXIT and 0.887 for FAILURE
in the Heckman model. Again we find that investor FE substantially reduce the marginal
eﬀect of trust on performance.
These results have several implications. First, none of the findings support the Co-
operative Trust hypothesis, which posits a positive relation between trust and investment
performance. All regressions suggest instead a negative relationship between trust and
performance, consistent with the Trust Hurdle hypothesis. Second, the evidence for the
Trust Hurdle hypothesis is consistent across specification, but not conclusive. This is
mainly because several of the trust coeﬃcients have p-values in a narrow range of 9-12%.
The trust eﬀect is stronger for the IPO and FAILURE variables than for the EXIT variable,
possibly because the latter is a noisier measure of successful performance. Third, there
is little evidence of selection on unobservables: the Mills ratios are mostly insignificant,
and the coeﬃcients are fairly similar with or without the Heckman correction. Fourth,
the inclusion of investor FE does account for much of the negative correlation between
trust and performance, especially for the IPO variable. This suggests that heterogene-
ity across venture capital firms plays a central role in the relationship between trust and
performance. This provides the impetus for the further analysis of investor heterogeneity
on the size of 2 VC firms, so we lose their 6 deals, leading to the 1129 deals in Table 6B. In Table 6A the
EXIT and FAILURE regressions have 1,125 observations, because all 4 Greek companies in our sample are
failures, so the logit model drops them. The number of deals in the IPO regression is still lower because
four countries have no IPOs. Finally, Table 7A has still fewer deals, due to the fact that a number of VC
firms do not experience certain types of exit, especially IPOs.
19Specifically, we use the delta method for the logit model of Table 6. The Heckman models are linear,
so the marginal eﬀect can be read oﬀ the coeﬃcient estimate directly. For the conditional logit in Table 7,
we use the coeﬃcient of the equivalent linear probability model.
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that we discuss in section 6.1.
5.3 Further discussion
We now discuss several extensions and robustness checks for our results about the eﬀect
of trust on outcome performance. For brevity’s sake the results are not reported here, but
are available upon request.
As we did for section 4, we employ alternative measures of trust: the socio-economic
measure of trust, and the measure of trust from the company perspective. In both cases
our results are confirmed, with very similar patterns in terms of coeﬃcients and statistical
significance. For the cardinal ’average trust’ measure, however, we find that the trust
coeﬃcient is always statistically insignificant. We also add the PARTNERS—TRUST and
PARTNERS—MATCH variables in order to explore the role of partner nationality in in-
vestment outcomes. These variables are never significant, and they do not change the
results for the coeﬃcient of trust (which only becomes marginally insignificant in the IPO
regression of Panel A of Table 6). While partners’ nationality has an eﬀect on investment
decisions, through the composition of the venture partnership, this eﬀects vanishes once
we examine the relationship between trust and investment outcomes.
We then consider alternative model specifications. First, we consider that the cycli-
cality of the venture industry might aﬀect our results. We thus interact the trust variable
with two dummies, one for the boom period (1998-1999) and one for the bust period
(2000-2001). In most regressions we do not find any significant diﬀerences for the two
periods, except in Panel A of Table 7 where the IPO coeﬃcient is significant for the boom
years but not the bust years. This foreshadows the analysis of section 6.2 where we will
use a more fine-grained measure of market attractiveness. Second, we use the minimal
distance between company and investors with multiple oﬃces and find that this does to
aﬀect any results. Third, we repeat the falsification exercise where we randomly assign
’false’ national identities to companies and investors. Again we find that all trust eﬀects
vanish, as expected.
We also include some robustness checks specific to the investment outcome regressions.
First, for the few companies with multiple deals we keep the earliest and delete all others.
This does not aﬀect any results. Second, we consider the possibility that some acquisitions
may be disguised failures. Acquisition values of private companies are rarely reported.
Still, we reclassify as failure those companies who report acquisition value below their
reported investment amounts, and find that none of our results are aﬀected. Third, we
reestimate the Heckman models of Tables 6 and 7 first replacing EXPORTS with FDI, and
then using both of them. In both instances we find that FDI is positive and significant
in the selection equation, and that the eﬀect of trust remains very similar both in the
selection and outcome equations.
6 Further evidence on the Trust Hurdle hypothesis
The evidence from section 5 is more consistent with the Trust Hurdle hypothesis than the
Cooperative Trust hypothesis. In this section we take a deeper look at several additional
predictions of the Trust Hurdle hypothesis. In section 7 we will then take a separate look
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at the Cooperative Trust hypothesis. In section 6.1. we focus on heterogeneity among
investors, whereas in section 6.2 we focus on heterogeneity among companies.
6.1 The role of partner experience
The Trust Hurdle hypothesis is based on the notion that investors face some costs of
overcoming trust hurdles. There may well be heterogeneity among investors, so that
these costs may diﬀer across diﬀerent investors. A natural conjecture is that the cost
of overcoming hurdles should be lower for more sophisticated investors. This could be
because they are less influenced by stereotypes that create artificial investment hurdles.
Or is could be that they have a comparative advantage in a low trust environment at
performing due diligence and convincing hesitant entrepreneurs. Sophisticated investors
should therefore be more likely to invest in low trust deals. They might also be better at
perceiving superior investment opportunities in these low trust environments. And as a
consequence, they should also have a relatively better performance with their low trust
investments.
To empirically test these additional predictions of the Trust Hurdle hypothesis, we
leverage our hand-collected survey data which contains information on individual partners
within venture firms. To measure investor sophistication we build on the prior work of
Kaplan, Martell and Strömberg (2007), who suggests that having work experience in the
US exposes European venture partners to best management practice and to a culture of
entrepreneurship that could facilitate the evaluation of business projects. Specifically we
construct a simple dummy variable for whether or not a particular venture firm has a
partner with US experience or not.
Econometrically, we want to look at the diﬀerential role of trust for more versus less
sophisticated investors. This means that we need to look at the interaction eﬀects of
trust and investor experience. We start by considering some univariate tests that relate
investors’ US experience with trust and investments performance. Panel A.1 of Table 8
shows that investors with US experience make investments with lower average trust scores
(0.485 versus 0.396). They also achieve a higher IPO rate (10.8% versus 4.8%), a higher
rate of exits (42.5% versus 30.5%), and a lower failure rate (48.3% versus 63.7%). For all
these, the t-statistic for the diﬀerence of means is significant at the 1% level.
These results raise the question whether the higher success rate of these more sophis-
ticated investors actually derives from their low trust investments. Panel A.2 reports
additional univariate statistics that distinguish between high trust and low trust invest-
ments. For this, we divide the realized deals sample at the median value of trust, and
call the subsample above (below) the median the high (low) trust subsample. Panel A.2
shows that better investment performance is invariably associated with low trust invest-
ments of investors with US experience. In fact, the diﬀerence between low and high trust
investments is always larger for investors with US experience. Consistent with this, the
last column of Panel A.2 show the statistical significance of the t-test for the diﬀerence
of means. For investors with US experience this diﬀerence is always significant at the 1%
level. For investors without US experience the diﬀerence is significant (at the 10% level)
only for IPOs. Moreover, the performance diﬀerence between investors with and without
US experience is always larger for low than for high trust deals, as reported in the last
row of Panel A.2. The diﬀerence in investment performance between investors with and
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without US experience is statistically significant at least at the 5% level for low trust deals,
but never significant for high trust deals.
While these univariate results are striking, they do not control for company and investor
characteristics. In Panel B of Table 8 we return to the model of Table 4 and examine
whether US experience aﬀects the relationship between trust and deal formation. We find
that the main eﬀect of trust remains strongly positive (significant at 1%), and that the
interaction eﬀect is negative and significant at 1%. This suggest that trust is relatively
less important for investors with US experience.
Panel C and D look at investment outcomes. Panel C estimates the logit model equiv-
alent to Panel A of Table 6; Panel D estimates the conditional logit equivalent to Panel
A of Table 7. The two panels yield similar results. There remains a negative relationship
between trust and performance, and this eﬀect is stronger for investors with US experi-
ence. The interaction eﬀect is statistically significant for the IPO and EXIT variables,
but insignificant for FAILURE. In terms of magnitude, the average marginal eﬀect of
trust for IPO in Panel C increases from -0.649 when US experience is zero to -1.180 when
US experience is one–a change of over 80%. Note that the main trust eﬀect is weaker
in these regressions, turning mostly insignificant. This suggests that the negative rela-
tionship between trust and performance is largely driven the more sophisticated investors
with US experience. Note also in Panel C the coeﬃcient for US experience is positive and
significant, confirming that investors with US experience perform better.
Overall we conclude that investor sophistication is important for the eﬀect of trust on
investment outcomes. More sophisticated investors are more willing to overcome trust hur-
dles in their investment choices. Moreover, their low trust investments are associated with
the best investment performance. This evidence confirms the additional predictions of the
Trust Hurdle that are based on investor heterogeneity. These findings are also inconsistent
with the Cooperative Trust hypothesis: one would expect more sophisticated investors to
take greater advantage of the easy interactions with the entrepreneurs, therefore expecting
a positive interaction term between trust and investor sophistication.
6.2 The role of market attractiveness
The previous section looked at the predictions of the Trust Hurdle hypothesis that concern
investor heterogeneity in the costs of overcoming trust hurdles. We now turn to predic-
tions that concern company heterogeneity in the benefits of overcoming trust hurdles.
Specifically, we look at diﬀerences in the attractiveness of the investment opportunities.
The Trust Hurdle hypothesis says that the more attractive an investment opportunity,
the more it is worthwhile to overcome trust hurdles. We define market attractiveness
as the potential of a set of companies to achieve good exit performance. We generate
two hypotheses about heterogeneity across such groups of companies. First, we should see
more low trust investments in markets that with more attractive investment opportunities.
Second, we would expect that the benefit of making a low trust investments is bigger in
more attractive markets.
Empirically it is diﬃcult to measure the attractiveness of investment markets. Ven-
ture capitalists themselves rely on private information and subtle signals. To overcome
this measurement problem we use the benefit of hindsight to create a measure of the
attractiveness of investment opportunities. Our measure does not look at the ex-post suc-
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cess of the company itself, but instead looks at what we call the company’s “market.” We
define a market as a unique combination of country, industry and year–e.g., biotech in
France in 1999. A market is the set of companies that received their first round of venture
investment in the same country, same industry and same year. For each market we ask
what fraction of companies experienced an IPO by August 2011.
To estimate such market IPO rates we do not rely on our sample companies, but in-
stead make use of all the companies found in the ThomsonOne (formerly VentureXpert)
database. This guarantees a much broader coverage, and avoids self-referential measure-
ment. We match the ThomsonOne data to our market definition and calculate market
IPO rates for each market. For each company, we define MARKET-ATTRACTIVENESS
as the respective market IPO rate. At the time of making a deal, investors clearly do not
know this ex-post measure of success. However, as long as their assessment of opportunity
is correlated with our measure of ex-post market success, we can use this measure as a
(noisy) proxy for the investor’s ex-ante beliefs about each company’s market attractiveness.
We examine the eﬀects of market attractiveness as we did for US experience. Results
are reported in Table 9. We divide the realized deals sample into two subsamples, where
deals with above (below) median market attractiveness are labeled as attractive (unattrac-
tive) markets. Panel A.1 shows that the average trust level is lower in hot markets. It also
shows that the IPO and exit rates are higher in attractive markets and the failure rate
lower. All these diﬀerences are statistically significant at the 1% level. This just confirms
that our measure of market attractiveness, based on ThomsonOne data, correlates with
the data of the companies in our survey.
Panel A.2 of Table 9 further shows that low trust investments in attractive markets
have a higher IPO rate, higher exit rate and lower failure rate than low trust investments in
unattractive markets. Moreover, the diﬀerence in the IPO rate between low and high trust
investments is larger and statistically more significant in attractive than in unattractive
markets. Similarly, the diﬀerence in the IPO rate between attractive and unattractive
markets is larger and statistically more significant for low trust investments. The same
observation is true for the exit rate. For the failure rate, instead, we find that these
diﬀerences are very similar.
Panel B of Table 9 shows the results for the deal regressions, where we now inter-
act trust with market attractiveness. The trust coeﬃcient remains strongly positive and
significant. The interaction of trust with market attractiveness is negative. In the logit
model it is statistically significant with a p-value of 2%, in the conditional logit model
the p-value falls to 12%. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the notion that trust
becomes less important in more attractive markets.
Panel C and D report the results for the exit regression. As expected, the coeﬃcients of
trust and of its interaction with market attractiveness are negative for the IPO and EXIT
regressions, and positive for the FAILURE regressions. In terms of statistical significance,
the results are mixed. The p-value for the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is often
marginally above the 10% conventional level, ranging between 7% and 17%. Similarly, the
coeﬃcients for TRUST are never significant, but often narrowly missing the 10% mark.
We interpret this evidence as suggestive although not conclusive for the hypothesis that
the relationship between trust and investment outcomes becomes more negative in more
attractiveness markets.
Overall, the results on market attractiveness reveal a pattern that is consistent (albeit
25
not always statistically significant) with the Trust Hurdle hypothesis. Trust matters less
for investments in more attractive markets. Moreover, the superior performance of low
trust deals stems mainly from those more attractive markets. Note also that, once again,
the evidence does not appear to be consistent with the Cooperative Trust hypothesis,
where we might expect that the benefits of an easier relationship between investors and
entrepreneurs should be worth more in more attractive markets, suggesting a positive
interaction eﬀect between trust and market attractiveness.
7 Further evidence on the Cooperative Trust hypothesis
The evidence so far does not support the Cooperative Trust hypothesis. In section 5
we noted that trust is negatively related to performance and in section 6 we noted that
interacting our trust measure with measures of both investor sophistication and market
attractiveness yields the opposite signs than expected under the Cooperative trust hy-
pothesis. This suggests that the dominant eﬀect in the data is the Trust Hurdle eﬀect.
The question remains of whether there are any eﬀects supportive of the Cooperative Trust
hypothesis. For this, we now examine some additional evidence.
We go beyond the analysis of investment performance, and ask whether trust aﬀects
other aspects of the investment relationship. Building on the prior venture capital litera-
ture, we focus on two aspects of the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs–see
Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri (2011) for a comprehensive overview. First, venture capital
investors are typically active value-adding investors (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), but there
is considerable heterogeneity in the interactions between investors and entrepreneurs (Bot-
tazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008)). Second, venture capitalists make use of sophisticated
contracts that impact the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs. In particular,
empirical work of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004) documents the pervasive use of
contingent control rights in US venture capital contracts.20
The Cooperative Trust hypothesis revolves around the benefits of higher trust. The
hypothesis is that higher generalized trust facilitates cooperation by allowing venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs to forge a closer and smoother working relationship. We
would therefore expect that higher generalized trust leads to a closer relationship and more
frequent interactions between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Moreover, we
would also expect less reliance on formal contractual arrangements, as there is less of a
need to design complicated contingent contracts.
To evaluate these additional predictions of the Cooperative Trust hypothesis, we lever-
age some of our unique hand-collected data. Our survey contains information on the fre-
quency of interaction between investors and entrepreneurs. It also contains information
about the use of contingent contracting clauses. Based on this we construct two additional
outcome measures. The first, INTERACTION, measures the frequency of interactions be-
tween the investors and each portfolio the company. The second variable, CONTINGENT
CONTRACTS, measures the use of contingent contracts in each deal.
Our main interest is to examine the Cooperative Trust hypothesis. For this we esti-
20The theoretical work of Dessein (2005) and Hellmann (2006) also explains how simple control structures
can give too much power either to the investor or the entrepreneur, and how control structures which are
contingent on firm performance can achieve more eﬃcient outcomes.
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mate regressions similar to those reported in Panel A of Tables 6 and 7. Panel A of Table
10 reports the results without investor FE. Because of the ordinal nature of the dependent
variables, we use ordered logit regressions. For robustness we also estimate linear and
Poisson regressions and found very similar results. Panel B of Table 10 adds investor FE.
Because of the large number of fixed eﬀects, we can only estimate linear regressions. We
find that the coeﬃcient of trust on INTERACTION is positive but highly insignificant
across all specifications. For the CONTINGENT CONTRACTS regression without in-
vestor FE, we find that the trust coeﬃcient is positive and significant. With investor FE
the coeﬃcient becomes highly insignificant.
The results of Table 10 again do not support the Cooperative Trust hypothesis. There
is no evidence of any significant eﬀect of trust on the frequency of interactions between
the investors and entrepreneurs. Even worse, contrary to the prediction of the hypothesis,
we find some evidence for a positive relationship between trust and the use of contingent
contracts.
The fact that we find positive (and sometimes significant) trust coeﬃcients in the con-
tingent contracts models is also worth commenting on.21 If generalized trust is not about
trusting the individual person, then we should not think of contingent contracts as solving
problems of insuﬃcient trust between the investor and the entrepreneur. Instead we might
think of contingent contracts as being aﬀected by how much the investor trusts institutions
in the entrepreneur’s country. Indeed, if the investor does not trust the institutions (e.g.,
legal enforcement) of the country where the company is located, there is not much point
in writing a sophisticated contract.22 This line of reasoning naturally generates a positive
relationship between generalized trust and the use of contingent contracts.
We also consider a battery of robustness checks along the lines of those for the deal and
exit regressions, which are available upon request We find that none of them aﬀects our
results: we use the socio-economic measure of trust and the company perspective trust,
we restrict the regressions to the foreign subsamples discussed in section 4.3.2, we employ
the minimal company-investor distance, we verify that the eﬀect of trust does not vary
significantly across boom and bust years,23 and we keep the earliest and delete all others
for the few companies with multiple deals. Our results are also robust to the falsification
exercise described in section 4.3.3.
As a robustness check we also look at the four individual types of contingent control
rights. In unreported logit regressions we consistently find that the coeﬃcients of trust are
positive. In a pattern consistent with Table 10, all but one one coeﬃcient are statistically
significant in the regressions without investor FE, while only one remains significant when
we include these FE. Furthermore, in unreported regressions we also examine Heckman
models, along the lines of Table 6B and 7B. We find that the results are very similar: the
21As noted above, this results holds in the specification without investor FE, but vanished with investor
FE. This suggests that contracting terms may be largely determined by the overall practices of the venture
capital firm, rather than on a deal by deal basis. This is consistent with recent findings by Bengtsson and
Ravid (2011) that venture capital firms tend to use similar contracts across portfolio companies.
22As suggested by Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom (2002), ’trust may be needed prior to setting
up a contract to ensure that the time and eﬀort invested in the contract, which can be seen as a relation-
specific investment, is not likely to be wasted.’ Poppo and Zenger (2002) also provide some empirical
evidence that trust and contracts can be complements.
23 In one of the four equations for this check we find that the eﬀect of trust is stronger in bust years for
the use of contingent contracts.
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trust coeﬃcient is insignificant in both INTERACTION models, it is positive and signif-
icant for CONTINGENT CONTRACTS model without investor FE, but again becomes
insignificant with investor FE.
8 Conclusion
Economists often distrust explanations that rely on subjective beliefs. Trust is a subjective
belief, but so is economists’ distrust of trust-based explanations. Hence the importance of
empirically establishing the eﬀect of trust.
No single paper can definitively decree the full economic importance of trust. The
approach we take in this paper is to examine the eﬀect of trust in a tightly defined envi-
ronment, venture capital, where we can obtain micro level data. This has the advantage
that we can safely dismiss concerns about reverse causality, and that we can control for a
large number of alternative explanations. For instance, we find that the eﬀect of trust on
investment remains strongly positive even after we control for both investor and company
fixed eﬀects, as well as a large number of additional controls.
We extend the research question to consider the relationship between generalized trust
and investment performance. We formulate two alternative hypotheses, that focus on trust
aﬀecting the benefits and costs of investments, respectively. We find that trust does not
operates on the benefits side, in term of higher trust generating superior exit performance,
as suggested by the "Cooperative Trust" hypothesis. Rather, we find that trust operates
on the private costs side, in terms of lower trust generating hurdles for making investments,
as suggested by the "Trust Hurdle" hypothesis. Our analysis also generates some novel
comparative statics: for example, we find that more sophisticated investors are more likely
to make low trust investments, and they achieve better investment performance from those
investments.
While previous work has shown the eﬀect of generalized trust in a variety of economic
situations, we believe that we are the first to look at trust in a corporate finance context.
Our results suggest that generalized trust may matter for investment choices, investment
outcomes and even financial contracts. Most interesting, we find that trust eﬀects diﬀer
across diﬀerent types of investors. We hope that this opens us a new line of research
in financial economics, to look at whether and when lack of generalized trust impacts
corporate financial transactions.
Our analysis also has some implications for policy. Governments across the globe are
seeking to attract venture capitalists to invest in their countries.24 Our results suggest
that investments will be more forthcoming from countries where there is higher generalized
trust. This provides some guidance as to what countries might be the most promising
targets for government that want to attract foreign venture capital investments.
24See Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006) and Lerner (2008).
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Table 1: Variable definitions
Table 1(a): Dependent variables
Deal is measured at the potential deal level. All other dependent variables are measured at the (realized) deal
level.
Variable Description
DEAL dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital firm has
invested in a particular company; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data
from our survey instrument, which asked venture firms to list all their
portfolio companies.
IPO dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has been exited
by October 2011 via an Initial Public Oﬀering ; 0 otherwise. The data
is obtained from the Amadeus, Zephyr, and SDC Platinum databases,
and from web searches.
EXIT dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has been exited
by October 2011 via an IPO or acquisition; 0 otherwise. The data is
obtained from the Amadeus, Zephyr, and SDC Platinum databases,
and from web searches.
FAILURE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if by October 2011 the company
had gone out of business or could not be traced; 0 otherwise. The data
is obtained from the Amadeus, Zephyr, and SDC Platinum databases,
and from web searches.
INTERACTION ordered categorical variable that takes values 1 to 4 depending on
whether the venture capital firm is reported to interact with the com-
pany on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. We obtain the
data from our survey instrument, which asked: How many times per
year does (did) the responsible partner(s)/manager(s) personally inter-
act with this company? (check one). Possible answers were: annually;
quarterly; monthly; weekly.
CONTINGENT CONTRACTS index measure of contingent control rights obtained from counting the
presence of the following four contingent control rights: control over the
board of directors, voting rights, company liquidation, and termination
of the founder’s employment contract. This variable takes a value be-
tween 0 and 4. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked the following questions: Does your firm has a right to obtain
control of the board of directors contingent on the realization of certain
events? Does your firm has a right to obtain voting rights contingent
on the realization of certain events? Does your firm has a right to
liquidate the company contingent on the realization of certain events?
Does your firm has a right to fire the founder/CEO contingent on the
realization of certain events? For all questions, the possible answers
were: Yes, No.
Table 1(b): Independent variables: Country-dyadic level
Country-dyadic variables are measured at the level of the investor country and company country pair.
Variable Description
TRUST percentage of the citizens in one contry that trust a lot people from the other country.
It is obtained from the Eurostat’s Eurobarometer question: "I would like to ask you
a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each,
please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust
at all." The answers range from 1 (no trust at all) to 4 (a lot of trust). Our measure is
the percentage of individuals who respond 4.
INFORMATION percentage of times a country is mentioned in the other country’s main business news-
paper over the 1998-2001 period, obtained from the Factiva database. For each country
dyad, we record the number of articles in the main business newspaper of country i that
mention in the headlines country j, or citizens of country j. We divide this number by
the total number of articles in the newspaper that are related to all the countries in our
sample. We set INFORMATION equal to zero for domestic deals (i=j ).
GDP DIFFERENCE diﬀerence (for each country pair) of the log-transformed per capita GDP, expressed in
euros and averaged over the 1998—2001 period. This variable is obtained from Datas-
tream.
LANGUAGE OVERLAP percentage of people who speak the same language in each country dyad. This variable
is set to 1 for domestic deals. The data is obtained from www.ethnologue.com.
LEGAL DIFFERENCE dummy variable that takes value 1 if investor and company are located in countries with
diﬀerent legal origins; 0 otherwise. We distinguish between Common law, French-origin
civil law, German-origin civil law, and Scandinavian-origin civil law. The data is obtained
from La Porta et al. (1998).
FOREIGN DEAL dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investor and company are from diﬀerent coun-
tries; 0 otherwise.
COMMON BORDER dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investor’s and company’s countries share a land
border; 0 otherwise (including domestic deals).
EUROVISION Normalized score of the votes from citizens of country i to the song of country j in the
Eurovision Song Contest, computed as in Felbermayr and Toubal (2007), averaged over
the period from 1993 to 2001. The variable is set to 0 for domestic deals. The data is
obtained from the www.eurovision.tv website.
EXPORTS percentage of the exports from country i to country j, out of the total export towards
the sample countries, averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001. This variable is set to
0 for domestic deals. The data is obtained from the UN World Trade database.
FDI percentage of the foreign direct investments from country i to country j out of the
total FDI towards the sample countries, averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001.
This variable is set to 0 for domestic deals. The data is obtained form OECD’s Main
Economic Indicators database.
Table 1(c): Other independent variables
Distance, Industry Fit, and Stage Fit are measured at the investor-company pair level; Independent VC, VC
Size, VC Age, and US Experience at the investor level; all other variables at the company level.
Variable Description
DISTANCE natural logarithm of one plus the kilometric distance between the venture capital investor
and the company. The distance is computed by applying the geodetic formula to the
longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates of each investor and company pair. This data is
obtained from www.multimap.com.
INDUSTRY FIT percentage of the deals made by the venture capital investor in the same industry of the
company.
STAGE FIT percentage of the deals made by the venture capital investor in the same stage at which
the company gets financed.
INDEPENDENT VC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist defines itself as an inde-
pendent venture firm; 0 otherwise
VC SIZE natural logarithm of one plus the amount under management of the venture capital firm
at the end of the sample period, in millions of current euros.
VC AGE. natural logarithm of one plus the age of the venture capital firm, measured in months at
the end of the sample period.
US EXPERIENCE dummy variables that takes value 1 if a venture capital investor has partners with US
work experience; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked, for each partner: Has this partner work experience in the US? Possible answers
were: Yes; No.
INDUSTRY set of dummy variables for each company’s industry. We obtain the data from our
survey instrument, which gave the following choices: Biotech and pharmaceuticals; Med-
ical products; Software and internet; Financial services; Industrial services; Electronics;
Consumer services; Telecommunications; Food and consumer goods; Industrial products
(including energy); Media & Entertainment; Other.
EARLY STAGE dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company raised seed or start-up finance; 0
otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Indicate the
type of your first round of financing to this company. Possible answers were: Seed;
Start-up; Expansion; Bridge.
DEAL DATE set of dummies for the year of the deal.
MARKET ATTRACTIV. average IPO rate in a company’s market. We define a market by the country, sector, and
year of the deal. For each market we compute the average IPO rate of companies that
received their first investment in that country, industry, and year. We obtain the IPO
rate data for each market from ThomsonOne.
INVESTOR F.E. set of 107 dummy variables, one for each investor.
COMPANY F.E. set of 1,170 dummy variables, one for each company.
INVESTOR—COUNTRY F.E. set of investor country dummy variables.
COMPANY—COUNTRY F.E. set of company country dummy variables.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
This Table provides descriptive statistics for the potential deals sample (Panel A) and for the realized deals sample
(Panel B). We report the mean, minimum and maximum values of the dependent and independent variables (except for
industry dummies). For dummy variables we report the frequency of observations. Variables are defined in Table 1.
POTENTIAL DEALS SAMPLE REALIZED DEALS SAMPLE
VARIABLE Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Deal 0.012 0 1 — — —
IPO — — — 0.085 0 1
Exit — — — 0.378 0 1
Failure — — — 0.542 0 1
Interaction — — — 2.931 0 1
Contingent Contracts — — — 1.331 0 4
Trust 0.203 0.037 0.716 0.434 0.071 0.716
Information 0.085 0 0.664 0.029 0 0.664
GDP Diﬀerence 0.106 0 0.618 0.056 0 0.284
Language Overlap 0.153 0 1 0.834 0 1
Legal Diﬀerence 0.179 0 1 0.051 0 1
Distance 6.720 0 9.323 3.843 0 9.176
Foreign Deal 0.893 0 1 0.182 0 1
Common Border 0.211 0 1 0.046 0 1
Industry Fit 0.146 0 1 0.368 0.018 1
Stage Fit 0.508 0 1 0.705 0.049 1
Independent-VC 0.679 0 1 0.599 0 1
VC-Size 170.505 1.300 4,100.000 223.405 1.300 4,100.000
VC-Age 78.433 12 390 97.568 12 390
US-Experience 0.544 0 1 0.581 0 1
Early Stage 0.586 0 1 0.586 0 1
Deal-1998 0.073 0 1 0.126 0 1
Deal-1999 0.170 0 1 0.213 0 1
Deal-2000 0.394 0 1 0.365 0 1
Deal-2001 0.363 0 1 0.296 0 1
Eurovision 0.334 —1.216 2.895 — — —
FDI 0.083 0 0.693 — — —
Exports 0.093 0 0.469 — — —
Market Attractiveness 0.080 0 1 0.089 0 1
Industry-Biotech and pharma 0.131 0 1 0.145 0 1
Industry-Medical products 0.070 0 1 0.070 0 1
Industry-Software and Internet 0.312 0 1 0.307 0 1
Industry-Financial services 0.037 0 1 0.037 0 1
Industry-Industrial services 0.035 0 1 0.036 0 1
Industry-Electronics 0.064 0 1 0.059 0 1
Industry-Telecom 0.079 0 1 0.079 0 1
Industry-Consumer services 0.121 0 1 0.121 0 1
Industry-Food and consumer goods 0.022 0 1 0.021 0 1
Industry-Industrial products 0.012 0 1 0.011 0 1
Industry-Media & entertainment 0.064 0 1 0.060 0 1
Industry-Other industries 0.053 0 1 0.032 0 1
Number of observations 101,620 1,228
Number of companies 1,170 1,170
Number of deals 1,228 1,228
Number of venture firms 107 107
Table 3: Correlations
This Table reports pairwise correlations (significance levels in brackets). Panel A reports correlations among variables in the potential deals sample. Panel B reports
correlations among variables in the realized deals sample. Variables are defined in Table 1.
Panel A: Potential deals sample
Dealt Trust Inform. GDP Lang. Legal Foreign. Common Mark. US
Diﬀer. Overlap Diﬀer. Dist. Deal Border Exports FDI Attract. Exp.
Deal 1.000
Trust
0.202
(0.00)
1.000
Information
—0.066
(0.00)
—0.219
(0.00)
1.000
GDP Diﬀ. —0.053
(0.00)
—0.384
(0.00)
0.011
(0.03)
1.000
Lang. Overlap
—0.217
(0.00)
0.673
(0.00)
—0.200
(0.00)
—0.238
(0.00)
1.000
Legal Diﬀer. —0.037
(0.00)
—0.064
(0.00)
0.210
(0.00)
0.127
(0.00)
0.128
(0.00)
1.000
Distance
—0.231
(0.00)
—0.464
(0.00)
0.219
(0.00)
0.298
(0.00)
—0.525
(0.00)
0.019
(0.00)
1.000
Foreign Deal
—0.255
(0.00)
—0.723
(0.00)
0.314
(0.00)
0.211
(0.00)
—0.842
(0.00)
0.161
(0.00)
0.616
(0.00)
1.000
Comm. Border
—0.055
(0.00)
0.031
(0.00)
0.310
(0.00)
—0.099
(0.00)
—0.017
(0.00)
0.379
(0.00)
—0.127
(0.00)
0.178
(0.00)
1.000
Exports
—0.047
(0.00)
—0.193
(0.00)
0.663
(0.00)
—0.036
(0.00)
—0.150
(0.00)
0.328
(0.00)
0.115
(0.00)
0.391
(0.00)
0.534
(0.00)
1.000
FDI
—0.050
(0.00)
—0.144
(0.00)
0.429
(0.00)
—0.028
(0.00)
—0.016
(0.00)
0.210
(0.00)
0.245
(0.00)
0.259
(0.00)
0.008
(0.00)
0.524
(0.00)
1.000
Mark. Attract.
0.009
(0.80)
0.014
(0.80)
0.101
(0.80)
—0.054
(0.00)
0.020
(0.00)
0.006
(0.07)
—0.052
(0.00)
—0.022
(0.00)
0.060
(0.00)
0.088
(0.00)
—0.007
(0.00)
1.000
US Experience
0.008
(0.01)
—0.014
(0.00)
—0.027
(0.00)
0.015
(0.00)
—0.058
(0.00)
—0.037
(0.00)
—0.075
(0.00)
—0.048
(0.00)
0.032
(0.00)
—0.036
(0.00)
0.021
(0.00)
—0.012
(0.00)
1.000
Panel B: Realized deals sample
Cont. GDP Lang. Legal Foreign Comm. Mark. US
IPO Exit Failure Interac. Contr. Trust Inform. Diﬀer. Overlap Diﬀer. Dist. Deal Border Attr. Exp.
IPO 1.000
Exit
0.391
(0.00)
1.000
Failure
—0.332
(0.00)
—0.849
(0.00)
1.000
Interaction
—0.054
(0.08)
—0.032
(0.31)
0.023
(0.47)
1.000
Cont. Contracts
—0.077
(0.02)
—0.019
(0.54)
0.011
(0.72)
0.285
(0.00)
1.000
Trust
—0.105
(0.00)
—0.101
(0.00)
0.141
(0.00)
0.211
(0.00)
0.262
(0.00)
1.000
Information
0.039
(0.20)
0.094
(0.00)
—0.160
(0.00)
—0.024
(0.00)
—0.149
(0.11)
—0.505
(0.00)
1.000
GDP Diﬀ. 0.110
(0.00)
0.155
(0.00)
-0.191
(0.00)
—0.318
(0.00)
—0.294
(0.11)
—0.587
(0.00)
0.276
(0.00)
1.000
Lang. Overlap
—0.072
(0.01)
—0.078
(0.00)
0.119
(0.00)
0.114
(0.00)
0.069
(0.02)
0.664
(0.00)
—0.726
(0.00)
—0.313
(0.00)
1.000
Legal Diﬀer. 0.010
(0.74)
0.060
(0.04)
—0.051
(0.00)
0.049
(0.11)
—0.042
(0.16)
—0.246
(0.00)
0.238
(0.00)
0.189
(0.00)
—0.346
(0.00)
1.000
Distance
—0.001
(0.98)
0.510
(0.09)
—0.105
(0.00)
—0.129
(0.00)
—0.077
(0.02)
—0.389
(0.00)
0.501
(0.00)
0.184
(0.00)
—0.548
(0.00)
0.209
(0.00)
1.000
Foreign Deal
0.065
(0.03)
0.079
(0.01)
—0.120
(0.00)
—0.100
(0.00)
—0.062
(0.02)
—0.684
(0.00)
0.740
(0.00)
0.313
(0.00)
—0.963
(0.00)
0.492
(0.00)
0.563
(0.00)
1.000
Comm. Border
0.107
(0.00)
0.095
(0.00)
—0.073
(0.01)
—0.104
(0.00)
—0.140
(0.00)
0.083
(0.00)
0.252
(0.00)
0.156
(0.00)
—0.366
(0.00)
0.586
(0.00)
0.176
(0.00)
0.463
(0.00)
1.000
Mark. Attract.
0.207
(0.00)
0.087
(0.00)
—0.076
(0.01)
—0.048
(0.13)
—0.090
(0.00)
—0.127
(0.00)
0.008
(0.79)
0.217
(0.00)
—0.037
(0.21)
0.007
(0.81)
—0.036
(0.22)
0.030
(0.31)
0.030
(0.31)
1.000
US Experience
0.104
(0.00)
0.120
(0.00)
—0.151
(0.00)
—0.146
(0.00)
—0.097
(0.00)
—0.287
(0.00)
0.201
(0.00)
0.297
(0.00)
—0.203
(0.00)
0.010
(0.72)
0.029
(0.31)
0.204
(0.00)
0.084
(0.00)
0.123
(0.00)
1.000
Table 4
Deal regressions: main model
This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions for the potential deals sample. The dependent variable
is DEAL. Variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions include investor fixed eﬀects. Company controls are a set of
dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage, and for the year the deal was completed. Columns (i) and (ii)
report results of logit regressions. Columns (iii) and (iv) report results of conditional logit regressions. These models
are discussed in Section 4.1. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in
parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the logit regressions, standard
errors are clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
DEAL DEAL DEAL DEAL
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Logit Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit
Trust 6.836∗∗∗ 6.498∗∗∗ 6.809∗∗∗ 6.484∗∗∗
(4.361) (3.490) (4.935) (3.917)
Information 4.122∗∗∗ 4.087∗∗∗
(3.245) (3.120)
GDP Diﬀerence —4.594∗∗ —4.431∗∗∗
(—2.495) (—2.597)
Language Overlap 0.680 0.666
(1.491) (1.160)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.174 —0.159
(—0.579) (—0.507)
Distance —0.226∗∗∗ —0.223∗∗ —0.222∗∗∗ —0.219∗∗∗
(—2.623) (—2.574) (—5.634) (—5.529)
Foreign Deal —2.237∗∗∗ —1.699∗∗ —2.202∗∗∗ —1.685∗∗
(—4.021) (—2.072) (—4.682) (—2.093)
Common Border 0.156 —0.249 0.147 —0.254
(0.535) (—0.893) (0.491) (—0.838)
Industry Fit 6.896∗∗∗ 6.930∗∗∗ 6.809∗∗∗ 6.838∗∗∗
(27.568) (27.717) (24.520) (25.123)
Stage Fit 2.947∗∗∗ 2.976∗∗∗ 2.915∗∗∗ 2.941∗∗∗
(13.601) (13.906) (17.355) (17.532)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 101,620 101,620 101,620 101,620
Pseudo 2 0.503 0.507 — —
Number of investors 107 107 107 107
Number of companies 1,170 1,170 1,170 1,170
Table 5
Deal regressions: models with exports and Foreign Direct Investments
This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions for the potential deals sample. The dependent variable
is DEAL. Variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions include investor fixed eﬀects. Company controls are a set of
dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage, and for the year the deal was completed. Columns (i) and (ii)
report results of logit regressions. Columns (iii) and (iv) report results of conditional logit regressions. These models
are discussed in Section 4.2. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in
parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the logit regressions, standard
errors are clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
DEAL DEAL DEAL DEAL
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
Trust 5.080∗∗∗ 5.102∗∗∗ 6.539∗∗∗ 6.526∗∗∗
(2.800) (2.918) (3.728) (3.670)
Exports 11.494∗∗∗ 11.254∗∗∗ – –
(3.587) (3.363)
FDI – – 5.777∗∗∗ 5.705∗∗∗
(6.965) (4.687)
Information 2.376∗∗ 2.376∗ 5.295∗∗∗ 5.248∗∗∗
(2.008) (1.873) (5.794) (4.165)
GDP Diﬀerence —5.570∗∗∗ —5.393∗∗∗ —6.906∗∗∗ —6.715∗∗∗
(—3.206) (-3.244) (—3.478) (—3.612)
Language Overlap —0.767 —0.753 —0.045 —0.049
(—1.145) (—0.948) (—0.095) (—0.076)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.055 —0.043 —0.368 —0.351
(—0.192) (—0.139) (—1.059) (—1.006)
Distance —0.219∗∗ —0.215∗∗∗ —0.218∗∗ —0.214∗∗∗
(—2.516) (—5.387) (—2.501) (—5.270)
Foreign Deal —4.489∗∗∗ —4.415∗∗∗ —3.100∗∗∗ —3.067∗∗∗
(—3.690) (—3.464) (—3.416) (—3.120)
Common Border —0.802∗∗ —0.796∗∗ —0.334 —0.333
(-2.276) (—2.190) (—1.130) (—1.093)
Industry Fit 6.978*∗∗ 6.883∗∗∗ 7.053∗∗∗ 6.954∗∗∗
(27.607) (24.781) (26.978) (24.609)
Stage Fit 2.977∗∗∗ 2.941∗∗∗ 2.961∗∗∗ 2.923∗∗∗
(13.870) (17.399) (13.358) (17.452)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 101,620 101,620 101,620 101,620
Pseudo 2 0.510 — 0.514 —
Number of investors 107 107 107 107
Number of companies 1,170 1,170 1,170 1,170
Table 6
Outcome regressions without investor fixed eﬀects
This Table reports results of regressions for the realized deals sample. The dependent variables are IPO, EXIT, and
FAILURE. Variables are defined in Table 1. Panel A reports results of logit regressions. Panel B reports results of a
Heckman selection model, where the outcome equation is a logit regression with the same specification as in Table 4,
and the excluded variable is Exports. Investor controls are a set of dummies for each investor’s country, size, age, and
type (independent vs. captive). Company controls are a set of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage,
and for the year the deal was completed. These models are discussed in Section 5.1. For each independent variable, we
report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Panel A: Logit model with investor controls
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Logit Logit Logit
Trust —15.772∗ —3.709 5.280∗
(—1.667) (—1.439) (1.912)
Information —4.245 1.632 —4.220∗∗∗
(—0.851) (0.916) (—2.818)
GDP Diﬀerence —3.032 —2.443 4.403
(—0.378) (—0.898) (1.337)
Language Overlap —4.263∗∗ -1.144 0.576
(—2.098) (—1.507) (0.722)
Legal Diﬀerence 0.251 1.019∗∗ —1.174∗∗
(0.276) (2.137) (—2.156)
Distance —0.106∗∗∗ 0.018 —0.033
(—2.602) (0.477) (—0.756)
Foreign Deal —8.455∗∗∗ —2.793∗∗ 3.002∗∗
(—2.670) (—2.513) (2.489)
Common Border 1.346 0.629 —0.301
(1.092) (1.473) (—0.758)
Industry Fit 0.061 0.061 0.028
(0.122) (0.124) (0.059)
Stage Fit 0.568 -0.100 -0.146
(1.046) (-0.528) (-0.815)
Investor controls Included Included Included
Company controls Included Included Included
Observations 1,054 1,125 1,125
Pseudo 2 0.235 0.119 0.140
Panel B: Heckman selection model
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Heckman Heckman Heckman
Trust —0.946∗∗ —0.855 1.136∗
(—2.445) (—1.266) (1.672)
Information —0.334 0.197 —0.673∗
(—1.499) (0.507) (—1.720)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.599 —0.368 0.733
(—1.301) (—0.458) (0.906)
Language Overlap —0.116 —0.239 0.150
(—0.909) (—1.074) (0.670)
Legal Diﬀerence 0.063 0.193 —0.235∗
(0.817) (1.441) (—1.738)
Distance —0.003 0.007 —0.010
(—0.632) (1.010) (—1.317)
Foreign Deal —0.217 —0.510 0.595∗
(—1.195) (—1.612) (1.869)
Common Border 0.079 0.148 —0.077
(1.316) (1.405) (—0.725)
Industry Fit —0.086 —0.061 0.066
(—1.561) (—0.640) (0.682)
Stage Fit —0.028 —0.054 —0.012
(—0.687) (—0.753) (—0.169)
Investor Controls Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
SELECTION EQUATION
Trust 1.856∗∗∗ 1.856∗∗∗ 1.856∗∗∗
(3.615) (3.615) (3.615)
Exports 5.411∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗
(6.823) (6.823) (6.823)
Information 0.826∗∗ 0.826∗∗ 0.826∗∗
(2.333) (2.333) (2.333)
GDP Diﬀerence —2.269∗∗∗ —2.269∗∗∗ —2.269∗∗∗
(—3.904) (—3.904) (—3.904)
Language Overlap —0.410∗∗ —0.410∗∗ —0.410∗∗
(—2.018) (—2.018) (—2.018)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.054 —0.054 —0.054
(—0.540) (—0.540) (—0.540)
Distance —0.110∗∗∗ —0.110∗∗∗ —0.110∗∗∗
(—11.699) (—11.699) (—11.699)
Foreign Deal —2.128∗∗∗ —2.128∗∗∗ —2.128∗∗∗
(—6.751) (—6.751) (—6.751)
Common Border —0.338∗∗∗ —0.338∗∗∗ —0.338∗∗∗
(—3.570) (—3.570) (—3.570)
Industry Fit 3.212∗∗∗ 3.212∗∗∗ 3.212∗∗∗
(27.932) (27.932) (27.932)
Stage Fit 1.359∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗
(15.818) (15.818) (15.818)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Mills  —0.063∗∗∗ —0.053 0.037
(—2.43) (—1.22) (0.81)
Observations 101,614 101,614 101,614
Realized deals 1,129 1,129 1,129
Wald 2(58) 210.66 195.32 245.12
Table 7
Outcome regressions with investor fixed eﬀects
This Table reports results of regressions for the realized deals sample with investor fixed eﬀects. The dependent variables
are IPO, EXIT, and FAILURE. Panel A reports results of logit regressions. Panel B reports results of a Heckman
selection model, where the outcome equation is a logit regression with the same specification as in Table 4, and the
excluded variable is Exports. Investor controls are a set of dummies for each investor’s country, size, age, and type
(independent vs. captive). Company controls are a set of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage,
and for the year the deal was completed. These models are discussed in Section 5.1. For each independent variable, we
report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. In the logit models standard errors are clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Panel A: Conditional Logit
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit
Trust —14.917 —2.489 5.977
(—1.550) (—0.781) (1.606)
Information —4.584 1.339 —5.264∗∗
(—0.913) (0.512) (—2.094)
GDP Diﬀerence —5.377 —0.289 2.575
(—0.743) (—0.080) (0.704)
Language Overlap —6.164 —0.813 0.272
(—1.331) (—0.891) (0.320)
Legal Diﬀerence 0.306 0.611 —1.121∗∗
(0.269) (0.981) (—2.049)
Distance —0.132∗∗∗ 0.036 —0.057
(—2.613) (1.024) (—1.541)
Foreign Deal —10.282∗∗ —2.059 3.133∗∗
(—2.022) (—1.396) (2.205)
Common Border 1.660 0.695∗ —0.492
(1.482) (1.867) (—1.019)
Industry Fit 1.579 0.654 —0.445
(1.599) (1.205) (—1.059)
Stage Fit 2.568∗∗∗ 0.209 —0.573
(3.156) (0.561) (—1.384)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Observations 621 1,037 1,045
Pseudo 2 0.185 0.052 0.051
Panel B: Heckman Selection Model
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Heckman Heckman Heckman
Trust —0.597 —0.206 0.896
(—1.279) (—0.257) (1.126)
Information —0.196 0.472 —0.971∗∗
(—0.687) (0.961) (—1.996)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.695 —0.143 0.534
(—1.463) (—0.175) (0.659)
Language Overlap —0.112 —0.139 0.130
(—0.809) (—0.581) (0.548)
Legal Diﬀerence 0.076 0.087 —0.192
(0.941) (0.625) (—1.390)
Distance —0.012 -0.001 —0.005
(—1.454) (—0.082) (—0.342)
Foreign Deal —0.282 —0.439 0.680∗∗
(—1.321) (—1.195) (1.870)
Common Border 0.072 0.139 —0.109
(1.150) (1.292) (—1.018)
Industry Fit 0.191 0.367 —0.264
(0.829) (0.925) (—0.672)
Stage Fit 0.159 0.154 —0.205
(1.453) (0.816) (—1.096)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included
Company controls Included Included Included
SELECTION EQUATION
Trust 1.836∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗
(3.580) (3.580) (3.580)
Exports 5.426∗∗∗ 5.426∗∗∗ 5.426∗∗∗
(6.846) (6.846) (6.846)
Information 0.826∗∗ 0.826∗∗ 0.826∗∗
(2.332) (2.332) (2.332)
GDP Diﬀerence —2.287∗∗∗ —2.287∗∗∗ —2.287∗∗∗
(—3.937) (—3.937) (—3.937)
Language Overlap —0.407∗∗ —0.407∗∗ —0.407∗∗
(—2.008) (—2.008) (—2.008)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.055 —0.055 —0.055
(—0.554) (—0.554) (—0.554)
Distance —0.110∗∗∗ —0.110∗∗∗ —0.110∗∗∗
(—11.758) (—11.758) (—11.758)
Foreign Deal —2.134∗∗∗ —2.134∗∗∗ —2.134∗∗∗
(—6.770) (—6.770) (—6.770)
Common Border —0.339∗∗∗ —0.339∗∗∗ —0.339∗∗∗
(—3.585) (—3.585) (—3.585)
Industry Fit 3.224∗∗∗ 3.224∗∗∗ 3.224∗∗∗
(28.022) (28.022) (28.022)
Stage Fit 1.364∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗
(15.905) (15.905) (15.905)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included
Company controls Included Included Included
Mills  0.043 0.097 —0.076
(0.46) (0.61) (—0.48)
Observations 101,620 101,620 101,620
Realized deals 1,135 1,135 1,135
Wald 2(141) 298.05 319.785 426.84
Table 8
The role of US experience
This Table reports results of univariate tests and of regressions for both the potential and the realized deals samples.Panel
A reports univariate results. Panel B reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions in the potential deals sample
with the same specifications of columns (ii) and (iv) of Table 4. The dependent variable is Deal. Panels C and D report
results of regressions in the realized deals sample. Dependents variables are IPO, EXIT, and FAILURE. Panel C reports
results of logit regressions without investor fixed eﬀects, and Panel D reports results of conditional logit regressions.
Variables are defined in Table 1. Investor controls are a set of dummies for each investor’s country, size, age, and type
(independent vs. captive). Company controls are a set of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage,
and for the year the deal was completed. These models are discussed in Section 6.1. For each independent variable, we
report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. In logit models standard errors are clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Panel A: Univariate tests
Panel A.1: Univariate tests, full sample
Trust IPO Exit Failure
US Experience 0.396 0.108 0.425 0.483
No US Experience 0.485 0.048 0.305 0.637
t-test
(p-value)
10.47 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
—3.51 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
—4.06 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
5.13 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
Panel A.2: Univariate tests, Trust High and Trust Low subsamples
Trust High Trust Low t-test (p-value)
IPO
US Experience 0.063 0.134 2.94 ∗∗∗(0.00)
No US Experience 0.035 0.074 1.78 ∗(0.08)
t-test (p-value) —1.49 (0.14) —1.97 ∗∗ (0.05)
Exit
US Experience 0.290 0.501 5.55 ∗∗∗(0.00)
No US Experience 0.299 0.315 0.35 (0.73)
t-test (p-value) 0.23 (0.82) —3.99 ∗∗∗(0.00)
Failure
US Experience 0.631 0.398 —6.09 ∗∗∗(0.00)
No US Experience 0.658 0.597 —1.26 (0.21)
t-test (p-value) 0.65 (0.51) 4.29 ∗∗∗(0.00)
Panel B: Deal regressions
DEAL DEAL
(i) (ii)
Logit Cond. logit
Trust 9.228∗∗∗ 9.208∗∗∗
(4.537) (4.666)
Trust-US-Experience —4.440∗∗∗ —4.421∗∗∗
(—3.850) (—3.332)
US Experience —0.041 –
(—0.036) –
Information 4.056∗∗∗ 4.021∗∗∗
(3.187) (2.987)
GDP Diﬀerence —4.433∗∗ —4.254∗∗
(—2.418) (—2.384)
Language Overlap 0.534 0.515
(1.121) (0.817)
Legal Diﬀerence -0.083 -0.065
(-0.261) (-0.181)
Distance -0.227∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗
(-2.577) (-5.561)
Foreign Deal —1.838∗∗ —1.827∗∗
(—2.162) (—1.974)
Common Border —0.328 —0.335
(—1.164) (—1.100)
Industry Fit 6.876∗∗∗ 6.783∗∗∗
(26.603) (23.788)
Stage Fit 2.955∗∗∗ 2.919∗∗∗
(13.487) (17.333)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included
Company Controls Included Included
Observations 101,620 101,620
Pseudo 2 0.510 —
Number of investors 107 107
Number of companies 1,170 1,170
Panel C: Outcome regressions without investor fixed eﬀects
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Logit Logit Logit
Trust —14.998 —3.137 5.323∗
(—1.375) (—1.096) (1.691)
Trust-US-Experience —2.929∗ —2.393∗ 1.763
(—1.792) (—1.904) (1.440)
US Experience 1.722∗ 1.749∗∗∗ —1.526∗∗∗
(1.787) (2.840) (—2.744)
Information —4.163 1.071 -3.784∗∗
(—0.872) (0.647) (-2.509)
GDP Diﬀerence —2.943 —1.959 4.257
(—0.382) (—0.738) (1.338)
Language Overlap —4.027∗ —1.371∗ 0.741
(—1.958) (—1.877) (0.951)
Legal Diﬀerence 0.393 1.267∗∗ -1.448∗∗
(0.438) (2.518) (-2.477)
Distance —0.103∗∗ 0.026 -0.044
(—2.397) (0.680) (-0.982)
Foreign Deal —8.832∗∗ —3.410∗∗∗ 3.665∗∗∗
(—2.556) (—2.999) (2.729)
Common Border 1.391 0.625 -0.304
(1.107) (1.436) (-0.742)
Industry Fit 0.013 -0.097 0.250
(0.026) (-0.207) (0.581)
Stage Fit 0.673 0.017 -0.291
(1.327) (0.092) (-1.441)
Investor Controls Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Observations 1,054 1,125 1,125
Pseudo 2 0.237 0.126 0.148
Panel D: Outcome regressions with investor fixed eﬀects
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit
Trust —13.920 —0.856 5.113
(—1.251) (-0.251) (1.324)
Trust-US-Experience —5.508∗ —4.755∗∗ 2.432
(—1.701) (—1.965) (0.919)
US Experience – – –
Information —4.493 1.312 -4-.978∗∗
(—0.854) (0.542) (—2.048)
GDP Diﬀerence —5.127 -0.508 2.809
(—0.695) (-0.138) (0.756)
Language Overlap —5.131 —1.063 0.390
(—1.055) (—1.177) (0.444)
Legal Diﬀerence 0.754 1.016 —1.323∗∗
(0.603) (1.389) (—2.081)
Distance —0.136∗∗∗ 0.034 —0.057
(—2.767) (0.976) (—1.508)
Foreign Deal —10.547∗ —2.964∗ 3.535∗∗
(—1.808) (—1.807) (2.405)
Common Border 1.813 0.698∗ —0.490
(1.613) (1.884) (—1.019)
Industry Fit 1.643 0.660 —0.446
(1.624) (1.206) (—1.057)
Stage Fit 2.437∗∗∗ 0.159 —0.556
(3.139) (0.422) (—1.334)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Observations 621 1,037 1,045
Pseudo 2 0.188 0.054 0.052
Table 9
Market attractiveness
ThisTable reports results of univariate tests and of regressions for both the potential and the realized deals samples.Panel
A reports univariate results. Panel B reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions in the potential deals sample
with the same specifications of columns (ii) and (iv) of Table 4. The dependent variable is Deal. Panels C and D report
results of regressions in the realized deals sample. Dependents variables are IPO, EXIT, and FAILURE. Panel C reports
results of logit regressions without investor fixed eﬀects, and Panel D reports results of conditional logit regressions.
Variables are defined in Table 1. Investor controls are a set of dummies for each investor’s country, size, age, and type
(independent vs. captive). Company controls are a set of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage,
and for the year the deal was completed. These models are discussed in Section 6.2. For each independent variable, we
report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. In logit models standard errors are clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Panel A: Univariate tests
Panel A.1: Univariate tests, full sample
Trust IPO Exit Failure
Attractive Markets 0.416 0.137 0.431 0.494
Unattractive Markets 0.452 0.034 0.326 0.590
t-test (p-value)
4.23 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
—6.30 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
—3.65 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
3.28 ∗∗∗
(0.00)
Panel A.2: Univariate tests, Trust High and Trust Low subsamples
Trust High Trust Low t-test (p-value)
IPO
Attractive Markets 0.079 0.168 2.97 ∗∗∗ (0.00)
Unattractive Markets 0.030 0.040 0.64 (0.52)
t-test (p-value) —2.61 ∗∗∗(0.00) —4.78 ∗∗∗(0.00)
Exit
Attractive Markets 0.317 0.493 4.12 ∗∗∗(0.00)
Unattractive Markets 0.282 0.393 2.75 ∗∗∗(0.00)
t-test (p-value) —0.85 (0.39) —2.42 ∗∗ (0.02)
Failure
Attractive Markets 0.609 0.431 —4.12 ∗∗∗(0.00)
Unattractive Markets 0.668 0.476 —4.62 ∗∗∗(0.00)
t-test (p-value) 1.38 (0.17) 1.07 (0.29)
Panel B: Deal regressions
DEAL DEAL
(i) (ii)
Logit Cond. Logit
Trust 6.873∗∗∗ 6.849∗∗∗
(3.458) (3.884)
Trust-Attractive-Market -2.634∗∗ -2.601
(-2.533) (-1.553)
Attractive Market 1.418∗∗ 1.401∗∗
(2.346) (1.975)
Information 4.331∗∗∗ 4.291∗∗∗
(3.387) (3.174)
GDP Diﬀerence —4.308∗∗ —4.097∗∗
(—2.319) (—2.232)
Language Overlap 0.860∗ 0.838
(1.688) (1.384)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.368 —0.348
(—1.086) (—0.946)
Distance —0.224∗∗ —0.220∗∗∗
(—2.524) (—5.435)
Foreign Deal —1.460∗ —1.455∗
(—1.702) (—1.744)
Common Border —0.266 —0.270
(—0.908) (—0.809)
Industry Fit 6.908∗∗∗ 6.814∗∗∗
(26.796) (24.793)
Stage Fit 2.993∗∗∗ 2.957∗∗∗
(13.638) (17.373)
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included
Company Controls Included Included
Observations 96,831 96,831
Pseudo 2 0.504 —
Number of investors 106 106
Number of companies 1,115 1,115
Panel C: Outcome Regressions without investor fixed eﬀects
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Logit Logit Logit
Trust —10.896 —3.296 2.831
(—0.705) (—1.285) (1.042)
Trust-Attractive-Market —6.952 —7.346∗ 5.701
(—1.516) (—1.758) (1.384)
Attractive Market 4.287∗ 2.148 —1.247
(1.817) (1.556) (—0.777)
Information —7.248 2.131 —4.840∗∗∗
(—1.003) (1.192) (—3.002)
GDP Diﬀerence 5.542 —0.496 2.494
(0.446) (—0.182) (0.766)
Language Overlap —9.416 —0.797 0.065
(—1.202) (—1.202) (0.087)
Legal Diﬀerence —3.089 0.846∗ —0.905
(—1.242) (1.693) (—1.605)
Distance —0.091∗ 0.022 —0.036
(—1.947) (0.559) (—0.802)
Foreign Deal —12.189 —2.087∗∗ 2.072∗
(—1.102) (—2.121) (1.841)
Common Border 1.478 0.873∗∗ —0.507
(0.792) (2.113) (—1.229)
Industry Fit —0.309 —0.119 0.172
(—0.712) (—0.249) (0.372)
Stage Fit 0.477 —0.125 —0.126
(0.857) (—0.687) (—0.700)
Investor Controls Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Observations 992 1,081 1,081
Pseudo 2 0.249 0.132 0.151
Panel D: Outcome regressions with investor fixed eﬀects
IPO EXIT FAILURE
(i) (ii) (iii)
Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit
Trust —14.008 —0.150 3.699
(—0.928) (—0.043) (1.067)
Trust-Attractive-Market —11.033∗ —8.989 7.990
(—1.783) (—1.622) (1.420)
Attractive Market 8.524∗∗∗ 3.315 —2.912
(3.107) (1.635) (—1.233)
Information —8.886 1.625 —5.550∗∗
(—1.235) (0.650) (—2.175)
GDP Diﬀerence 5.970 1.926 0.010
(0.485) (0.476) (0.003)
Language Overlap —25.102 —0.285 —0.289
(—1.373) (—0.290) (—0.337)
Legal Diﬀerence —6.978 0.314 —0.801
(—1.509) (0.361) (—1.176)
Distance —0.125∗∗ 0.038 —0.062∗
(—2.379) (1.136) (—1.650)
Foreign Deal —29.185 —1.218 2.313∗
(—1.430) (—0.705) (1.716)
Common Border 2.214 1.060∗∗∗ —0.861∗
(1.623) (2.823) (—1.701)
Industry Fit 0.945 0.315 —0.133
(1.019) (0.629) (—0.320)
Stage Fit 2.653∗∗∗ 0.239 —0.604
(3.465) (0.658) (—1.428)
Investor Fixed Eﬀect Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included
Observations 582 994 1,002
Pseudo 2 0.213 0.065 0.061
Table 10
Cooperation between investors and companies
This Table reports results of ordered logit and linear regressions for the realized deals sample. The dependent variables
are Contingent Contracts and Interaction. Variables are defined in Table 1. Panel A reports results of ordered logit
regressions; Panel B reports results of a linear probability model with investor fixed eﬀects. These models are discussed
in Section 7. Investor controls are a set of dummies for each investor’s country, size, age, and type (independent vs.
captive). Company controls are a set of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage, and for the year the
deal was completed. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis)
computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the ordered logit logit models standard
errors are clustered by country-dyad. Values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identified by ***, **, *.
Panel A: Ordered logit regressions
CONTINGENT
INTERACTION CONTRACTS
(i) (ii)
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit
Trust —6.414 10.859∗∗∗
(—1.231) (3.025)
Information 4.133 2.095
(1.536) (1.366)
GDP Diﬀerence 2.297 —0.673
(0.333) (—0.238)
Language Overlap 7.383∗ 0.044
(1.946) (0.047)
Legal Diﬀerence 3.277∗∗ —0.386
(2.407) (—0.562)
Distance —0.038 —0.024
(—0.928) (—0.870)
Foreign Deal 3.995 3.235**
(1.057) (2.039)
Common Border —2.555∗∗∗ —1.577∗∗∗
(—2.706) (—3.044)
Industry Fit 0.061 —0.509
(0.115) (—0.681)
Stage Fit 0.521 0.019
(0.722) (0.031)
Investor controls Included Included
Company controls Included Included
Observations 1,068 1,087
Pseudo 2 0.438 0.170
Panel B: Linear regressions with investor fixed eﬀects
CONTINGENT
INTERACTION CONTRACTS
(i) (ii)
Linear probability Linear probability
Trust 0.391 0.527
(1.338) (0.548)
Information 0.277 0.684
(1.115) (0.918)
GDP Diﬀerence —0.175 —2.384∗∗
(—0.438) (—2.000)
Language Overlap 0.242∗∗ —0.318
(2.354) (—0.992)
Legal Diﬀerence —0.021 0.417∗∗
(—0.317) (2.306)
Distance 0.003 —0.008
(0.583) (-0.871)
Foreign Deal 0.253∗ —0.248
(1.693) (-0.522)
Common Border —0.086∗ —0.113
(—1.725) (—0.645)
Industry Fit -0.038 0.196∗
(-0.635) (1.678)
Stage Fit 0.002 —0.058
(0.033) (—0.523)
Investor controls Included Included
Company controls Included Included
Observations 1,068 1,087
2 0.721 0.863
 Figure 1: Trust and VC market size 
 
 
This figure shows the relationship between countries’ trust and the size of their venture capital market. Each observation represents a country  in our dataset. 
Trust (received) is the average percentage of people who expressed high trust in the Eurobarometer data.  A value of 20 means that on average 20% of people 
expressed high trust. VC market size is measured as the total venture capital investments divided by the country’s per‐capita GDP, for the period 1998‐2001.  
